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Beginning From (My) Experience: The
Paradoxes of Lesbian/Queer Narrativities
by
RUTHANN ROBSON*
The shaping of experience into narrative is a staple of progressive
legal theorizing, including lesbian/queer' legal theorizing. The impor-
tance of narrative rests upon two intertwined beliefs. First, it rests upon
the belief that the extant legal theories and doctrines are impoverished be-
cause they are based upon the experiences only of dominant groups,
those who have had the power to construct the theories and doctrines.
Second, the importance of narrative rests upon the belief that the present
legal landscape can be improved if those of us outside the dominant
group make public our experiences. In short, the argument provides that
lesbians and other queers, faced with a dominant legal regime to which
we are essentially "foreigners," can effect change in the law by telling
our stories.
the beginning
Let me begin again, this time with a quote:
* Professor of Law, City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law. This Arti-
cle is based upon remarks at the Intersexions Symposium, held March 1997 in San Francisco,
California. I am indebted to the organizers of the Symposium, especially Sarah Colby, as well
as to the other participants. Some of my initial ruminations about this topic were delivered at
the Modem Language Association (MLA) Conference, held December 1996 in Washington,
D.C., on the panel "The Novel, Queer Theory, and Narrativity: Novelists on Queer Theory,"
moderated by Joe Boone. I am appreciative of the comments by the other novelists on the
panel: Michael Cunningham, Samuel Delaney, Jonathan Strong, and especially Valerie Miner.
I would also like to thank my research assistants, Julian Kahuna White and Jana Jacobson,
and to thank Eve Preminger for her generous support of faculty scholarship at CUNY School of
Law. This Article benefited from a CUNY Law Faculty Professional Development Award.
1. I use the term "queer" to denote gay male, lesbian, bisexual, transgendered, and other
minority sexualities. I use the term "lesbian/queer" because my focus is specifically lesbian
and because of the historical and contemporary erasure of lesbianism in discussions of minority
sexual practices, cultures, and theorizing.
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What would happen if one woman told the truth about her life?
The world would split open2
To include such an epigraph is to lay the foundation for a personal reve-
lation: what feminists would name experience,3 what Foucault might call
an engagement in the confessional mode, 4 what postmodernists would la-
bel narrativity,5 and what legal theorists might entitle story-telling6 or out-
sider jurisprudence. 7
And like most epigraphs, this one probably has more resonance for
its user than for its audience. The first time I heard these words, they
were read aloud not by their author, the poet Muriel Rukeyser,8 but by a
fellow student in a women's literature course. We were using the then-
newly-published anthology, No More Masks!: An Anthology of Poems by
2. MURIEL RUKEYSER, Kiithe Kollwitz, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF MURIEL
RUKEYSER 479-84 (1978).
3. See infra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
4. 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 58 (Robert Hurley trans., Pan-
theon Books 1978) (1976) (arguing that since at least the Middle Ages, confession has been one
of the "main rituals" relied upon for the "production of truth").
5. While the use of the terms "narrative," "narrativity," or "narratology," does not be-
long exclusively to postmodern discourse, these terms seem to predominate in structuralist,
critical theory, semiotic, and post-structuralist texts. For a helpful volume containing defini-
tions of these terms, as well as hundreds of other terms, see generally GERALD PRINCE,
DICTIONARY OF NARRATOLOGY (1987).
6. See, e.g., Margaret (H.R.) Chon, On the Need for Asian-American Narratives in Law:
Ethnic Specimens, Native Informants, Storytelling and Silences, 3 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 4
(1993); Lisa Crooms, Stepping Into the Projects: Lawmaking, Storytelling, and Practicing the
Politics of Identification, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (1996).
7. Man Matsuda is generally believed to have coined the term "outsider jurisprudence."
Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2320, 2323-24 (1989). Others have used the term "outsider scholarship." See, e.g.,
Mary Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 683
(1992), or "outsider narratives." See, e.g., Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Telling a Black Legal
Story: Privilege, Authenticity, "Blunders, " and Transformation in Outsider Narratives, 82 VA.
L. REV. 69, 69 (1996). This is not to suggest, however, that personal revelation is co-extensive
with outsider jurisprudence. See infra note 97.
8. Muriel Rukeyser (1913-1980) "has long been known as one of the neglected, yet great
and essential female voices of the twentieth century." THE OXFORD COMPANION TO WOMEN'S
WRITING IN THE UNITED STATES, 772-73 (Cathy N. Davidson & Linda Wagner-Martin eds.,
1995) [hereinafter OXFORD COMPANION TO WOMEN'S WRITING]. In addition to being a poet,
Rukeyser was a novelist, biographer, translator, playwright, and theater critic. In her work and
her life, she was known for her "outspoken political activism." See 6 TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICAN LITERATURE 3463 (Harold Bloom ed., 1987). To date, there has not been a full-
length biography of Rukeyser. Biographers of other twentieth century writers portray Rukey-
ser's affairs with women. See, e.g., MARGOT PETERS, MAY SARTON: A BIOGRAPHY 145
(1997) (describing affair between Sarton and Rukeyser).
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Women,9 and the very idea that there were enough poems written by
women to fill an entire book seemed rather exciting. Part of each class
consisted of a student presentation: a student would select a poem and
read it aloud, talk about what the poem meant to her personally, and then
facilitate a class discussion about the poem. In these discussions, we
never mentioned line breaks or meters, and we almost always talked
about our lives. Although it could not be graded in a traditional manner,
we knew that telling and listening to our experiences was a fundamental
portion of the course.
Kdthe Kollwitz is the title of the poem by Muriel Rukeyser that my
fellow student read aloud. KMithe Kollwitz was a visual artist, working in
Germany between World Wars One and Two, most famous for her paci-
fism and her woodcuts. Her life was the subject of a biography, pub-
lished a few years after the anthology.10 In the Rukeyser poem, Kollwitz
becomes an embodiment of the dilemma of the woman artist-caught
between her female gender and her "masculine art." The poem provoked
stories from the women in the class, a large proportion of whom were
then called "returning women." These returning women spoke about
their struggles to do the reading for classes and attend to their demanding
husbands and children; their tales were full of topless toothpaste tubes
and televisions.
"If one woman told the truth about her life, the world would split
open," the woman who had read the poem aloud paraphrased. Her voice
was sharp as she spoke very eloquently about being prescribed Valium
when she told her physician husband that she felt her life was empty and
she wanted to go to college. I remember that she spoke a long time,
longer than had become customary. I remember looking across the circle
at one of the other younger students in the room, trying to catch her eye
and looking away when I did. I remember the sympathetic expression on
the professor's face. I remember it was spring, but I was still wearing
boots. I remember tamping down my own reactions to what I saw as her
economic privilege; I remember thinking that she could have sold the
Valium on a street comer or on campus and I could have told her some
good locations; I remember thinking that she was lucky to have tooth-
paste, topless or not. But this is what I remember most of all: no matter
9. No MORE MASKS!: AN ANTHOLOGY OF POEMS BY WOMEN (Florence Howe & Ellen
Bass eds., 1973).
10. MARTHA KEARNS, KATHE KOLLwITZ: WOMAN AND ARTIST (1976).
how much truth she told about her life, the world did not split open. At
least not for me.
Because what I understood Muriel Rukeyser to mean, even allowing
for poetic excess, was that the world was as susceptible to being ruptured
by the story of an ordinary woman as a chicken could be cleaved in half
by the sharp knife of a skillful chef. And every evening, in the restaurant
where I waitressed, I could hear bones cracking as the chicken breasts
were being sundered and sliced. Sometimes I would proffer this experi-
ence as the basis for my vegetarianism. I might even crack my knuckles
as a soundtrack.
beginning again
Let me begin again, because I have digressed, as telling a story often
leads one to do. What I want to discuss is the current state of narrativity
in lesbian/queer legal theorizing. But any attempt at this discussion leads
me to the role of experience in theorizing, especially in feminist theoriz-
ing. For although lesbian/queer narratives often accompany feminist nar-
ratives as well as racialized and ethnicized narratives-under the rubric of
"outsider" scholarship-the explicit links between the feminist emphasis
on experience and the present popularity of narrativity often remain un-
explored.
from epistemology to experience
This is not to say that experience as epistemological method and the
critiques of such are originary with feminists. To theorize at all, even if
such theorizing is labeled ontological, is to engage the questions of epis-
temology-how we know what we (think we) know. In the ancient Chi-
nese philosophic tradition, the most famous example is Chuang-tzu's
story of the man who dreams he is a butterfly: "He didn't know if he
was Chueng Chou who had dreamt he was a butterfly, or a butterfly
dreaming he was Chueng Chou."" Similarly, Plato's allegory of the
cave points to the partiality of perception-experience-for apprehending
reality." Building on both Chinese and Greek traditions, Hegel sought to
11. CHUANG-TZU, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF CHUANG-TZU 49 (Burton Watson trans.,
1968). Chuang-tzu (399-295 B.C.), now romanized as Zhuangzi, is generally considered to be
a founder of the Chinese philosophy of Taoism, along with the more famous Lao-Tzu, now ro-
manized as Laozi, the author of the Tao-fe Ching.
12. PLATO, Republic; Book 7, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES 575, 747 (Edith Hamilton
& Huntington Cairns eds., 1961). Plato (428-347 B.C.) is the reputed author of thirty-five
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explain experience as the"dialectical process which consciousness exe-
cutes on itself,"13 meaning that experience was both the mind's apprehen-
sion of a thing and the thing itself. Both before and after Hegel, count-
less other philosophers, including Kant, 14 Husserl,15 Heidegger,16
Hume,17 all struggled with the role and reliability of experience in theo-
rizing, yet most of these thinkers concentrated on ontological matters. 8
Karl Marx, however, eschewed ontology for an imposition of the dialec-
tical "history of consciousness" onto the experience of economics and
state power. 19
Yet we do not necessarily think of Chuang-tzu or Plato as authorities
on experience, at least in the sense that we have come to think of experi-
ence. In its contemporary usage, experience is not the perception of ob-
jects qua objects, but is a more complicated-and personally unique-
dialectically structured dialogues featuring the learned Socrates. The allegory of the cave, ap-
pearing in the extended dialogue Republic, which mostly concerns theories of justice, is a rejec-
tion of empiricism. In the allegory of the cave, Socrates describes persons chained in a cave,
unable to view each other, and able only to see a series of shadows on the wall of the cave. See
id. at 747. These shadows are considered "real." See id. Once removed from the cave, an
individual realizes that the shadows are in fact shadows and are made by a series of statues of
objects. See id. at 747-48.
13. G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 142 (J.B. Baille trans., Harper &
Row 1967) (1807).
14. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, A CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (Norman Kemp Smith
trans., MacMillian & Co., Ltd. 1st ed. 1929) (1781). Kant (1724-1804) argued for the exis-
tence of a priori concepts which are not dependent upon sensations or objects.
15. See generally EDMUND HUSSERL, IDEAS: GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PURE
PHENOMENOLOGY (W.R. Boyce Gibson trans., Humanities Press 1931) (1913). Husserl
(1859-1938) is generally considered to be the founder of phenomenology, which includes the
"bracketing of existence" so that the focus is on the meanings of an object in the human mind,
regardless of whether or not the object is "real."
16. See generally MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (John Macquarrie & Edward
Robinson trans., Harper 1962) (1927). Heidegger (1889-1976) was primarily concerned with
human "being" and the struggle for humans to achieve authentic existence and meaning despite
their interactions in the world of objects which have come to them through time.
17. See generally DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
(Oxford U. Press 3d ed. 1975) (1777). Hume (1711-76), known as the Scottish skeptic, argued
that reason is simply the habitual association of experiences, thereby rejecting rational notions
such as causation. Even more fundamentally, Hume rejected the existence of the individual,
arguing that an individual is simply a "bundle" of different perceptions.
18. Which is not to say that these philosophers were devoted exclusively to ontological
matters. David Hume, for example, wrote a six-volume history of England; Immanuel Kant is
well-known for his philosophical investigations into ethics; Plato and Hegel both wrote exten-
sively about the state as well as aesthetics.
19. See KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Samuel Moore &
Edward Aveling trans., Kerr & Co. 1906) (1867). Originally published in German in 1867,
this classic has influenced generations of philosophers, political scientists, economists, and ac-
tivists.
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process involving a host of interpersonal relationships, social conditions,
environmental interactions, and events. The critiques of subjectivity,
however, apply equally forcefully to experience as perception of objects
and experience as personal history. In both cases, experience presup-
poses a fully constituted individual: perception and experience are
something a person has.' °
Nevertheless, it is also widely recognized that experience constructs
subjectivity. Even in a traditional philosophical dialectical process, con-
sciousness itself is transformed by the apprehension of the object. In
Marxist terms, "[1]ife is not determined by consciousness but conscious-
ness by life.""1 Similarly, we routinely relate specific experiences in our
personal histories as a way of explaining our current personalities and we
speak of transformative experiences.
For feminists of the 1970s, consciousness-raising-the sharing of
personal experiences-was itself postulated as a transformative experi-
ence. Hearing one's own story spoken by one's self and recognizing
one's own story in the stories of other women was itself an experience
which would lead to a reconceptualization of the way one thought of
one's own life and of one's identity as a woman. The relevance of expe-
rience, shared in the context of consciousness-raising sessions (whether
formally named as such or not), has been called a core concept of femi-
nism. 2 The reliance of women on individual experience allowed women
to question previously held "objective" notions, such as that women were
not oppressed as women. Perhaps ironically, it was individual experi-
ence that formed the basis for shared identity-by speaking about indi-
vidual problems women were to realize that these experiences were not in
fact individual in the sense of being unique "personal" problems, but
were part of larger patterns. According to an early 1970s "working
sheet" for a beginning consciousness-raising group: "The consciousness-
raising process is one in which personal experiences, when shared, are
20. See Joan Scott, Experience, in FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE POLITICAL 22, 27-33 (Judith
Butler & Joan W. Scott eds., 1992) (discussing only the sense of experience as used by Anglo-
American historians-and not the sense of experience as perception-and noting that "experi-
ence is something people have").
21. KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 47 (C.J. Arthur ed.,
Lawrence & Wishart 2d ed. 1974) (1846).
22. See JUDITH GRANT, FUNDAMENTAL FEMINISM: CONTESTING THE CORE CONCEPTS
OF FEMINIST THEORY 4 (1993) (arguing that "much of the richness" as well as "a good por-
tion" of the problems of feminist theory are traceable to the three "core concepts" of feminism,
which are "woman," experience, and personal politics).
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recognized as a result not of an individual's idiosyncratic history and be-
havior, but of the system of sex-role stereotyping."21 Or, as stated two
decades later by feminist theorist Catharine MacKinnon:
The analysis that the personal is political came out of consciousness
raising. It has four interconnected facets. First, women as a group are
dominated by men as a group, and therefore as individuals. Second,
women are subordinated in society, not by personal nature or by biol-
ogy. Third, the gender division, which includes the sex division of la-
bor which keeps women in high-heeled low-status jobs, pervades and
determines even women's personal feelings in relationships. Fourth,
since a woman's problems are not hers individually but those of women
as a whole, they cannot be addressed except as a whole. In this analysis
of gender as a nonnatural characteristic of a division of power in soci-
ety, the personal becomes the political. 24
There are many pitfalls and problems with consciousness-raising.
First, the process as a means to its proclaimed end is debatable. Al-
though many feminists posited the slogan "the personal is political" as a
retort to New Left nonfeminists who interpreted consciousness-raising as
simply personal therapy,' some feminists themselves expressed doubts as
to the relationship between relating personal incidents and the achieve-
ment of political solutions. For example, as early as 1971, Carol Wil-
liams Payne published her piece about leaving her consciousness-raising
group because she "felt that nothing could be accomplished by becoming
more and more intimate with a small group of women." 2 Furthermore,
once a group abandoned the "group therapy" model, 7 the ability to take
concrete action was often hampered by the group's devotion to the lead-
erless, "structureless" mode of organization.'
Further, like any methodology that posits experience as a path to
truth, consciousness-raising possesses a fundamental flaw-the inability
to account for women who experienced their own experiences as different
from the political "truth" being proffered by others. This flaw led to an
23. Consciousness Raising, in RADICAL FEMINISM 280, 280 (Anna Koedt et al. eds.,
1973). The unsigned piece also includes a list of topics which could be discussed by a group.
24. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOwARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 95
(1989).
25. See GRANT, supra note 22, at 37.
26. Carol Williams Payne, Consciousness Raising: A Dead End?, in RADICAL FEMINISM,
supra note 23, at 282, 284.
27. Id.
28. See Joreen, The 7yranny of Structurelessness, in RADICAL FEMINISM, supra note 23,
at 285, 293 ("Unstructured groups may be very effective in getting women to talk about their
lives; they aren't very good for getting things done.").
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adoption of the concept of false consciousness,29 the state inhabited by
those who did not (yet) understand their condition in feminist terms. Yet
because feminism itself attacked the existence of objective and singular
truth (heretofore male), the positing of a singular truth necessary to ren-
der false consciousness "false" was problematic. Further, this version of
truth was deemed partial, having been based only upon a relatively privi-
leged and predominantly white group of women."
Despite the problems with consciousness-raising and the role of ex-
perience in feminist theorizing, it is important to remember the roots of
the practice of relating individual experiences. Sharing experiences was
intended to foster recognition of shared conditions and to reject the notion
of individual pathologies. The goal was to forge an understanding that
women's lives were constrained by political forces. It was not necessary
that this goal be achieved by the particular method of sharing experience
through consciousness-raising; what was necessary was that this under-
standing would lead to political action to improve women's lives.31 Thus,
the sharing of experience was never in and of itself a goal.
coming out
The closest parallel to feminist consciousness-raising in the les-
bian/queer context is "coming out." The stereotypical coming out narra-
tive constructs an individual's experience as a linear progression, culmi-
29. The term "false consciousness" is derived from Marx, although apparently Marx him-
self never utilized the phrase. Nevertheless, the concept is fundamental to the Marxist concept
of ideology, especially given the postulate that the ruling class is able to control the means of
intellectual as well as material production. See MICHtLE BARRETT, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH:
FROM MARX TO FOUCAULT 7-10 (1991). The feminist adoption of the term may or may not
have been Marxist-influenced. See GRANT, supra note 22, at 32 (arguing that although some
early radical feminists may have believed it was so derived, it merely followed from feminism's
emphasis on experience).
30. See, e.g., ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF
EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT 80-132 (1988); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 585 (1990).
31. Writing in 1972, Joreen notes:
Consciousness raising as the main function of the women's liberation movement is be-
coming obsolete. Due to the intense press publicity of the last two years and the nu-
merous overground books and articles now being circulated, women's liberation has
become a household word. Its issues are discussed and informal rap groups are
formed by people who have no explicit connection with any movement group. Purely
educational work is no longer such an overwhelming need. The movement must go
on to other tasks. It now needs to establish its priorities, articulate its goals, and pur-
sue its objectives in a coordinated fashion.
Joreen, supra note 28, at 297.
[Vol. 48
August 1997] PARADOXES OF LESBIAN/QUEER NARRATIVITIES
nating in the revelation of one's lesbian or queer sexual identity.32 As
lesbian theorist Judith Roof notes, the "quintessential lesbian narrative is
the coming out story, not because there is something inherently lesbian
about it, but because it is both ubiquitous and proclaimed as such by les-
bians. " " In lesbian literature, the coming out story is the common
bildungsroman" In a lesbian studies course, a professor may have the
students "share" their "coming out stories. " " Lesbian legal scholar
Mary Dunlap has suggested that in order to evaluate scholarship, it is
necessary that an author adhere to an ethical duty to elucidate his or her
own experiences which are pertinent to the subject."
Yet although there is a sharing of stories in literary and other modes
of cultural production, I do not believe that "coming out" is necessarily a
narrative process in and of itself. As Kenneth Plummer suggests, narra-
tive is important in the production of individual as well as communitarian
sexual identities,37 yet it is not the same as "life."38 Thus, although
coming out can be constructed as a story and often results in the recon-
struction of a narrative of one's experiences, it is distinguishable from
consciousness-raising because one does not necessarily come out through
the revelation of one's own story combined with a recognition of its
commonality with the other stories one is hearing. Further, coming out
does not necessarily have the required "beginning, middle, and end" of
narrative structure because we often refer to "coming out" to denote a
declarative statement about one's sexual identity rather than a retelling of
a story of which the claiming of an identity is the end.3' Additionally,
32. See KENNETH PLUMMER, TELLING SEXUAL STORIES: POWER, CHANGE AND SOCIAL
WORLDS 82-83 (1995).
33. JUDITH ROOF, COME AS You ARE: SEXUALITY AND NARRATIVE 104 (1996).
34. BONNIE ZIMMERMAN, THE SAFE SEA OF WOMEN: LESBIAN FICTION 1969-1989, 35-
38 (1990).
35. See, e.g., Sample Syllabi from Courses on Lesbianism, in LESBIAN STUDIES:
PRESENT AND FUTURE 217 (Margaret Cruikshank ed., 1982).
36. See Mary Dunlap, Foundering on the Seas of Hopelessness: A Review of Gays/Justice,
87 MICH. L. REv. 1366, 1368 n.8 (1989); Mary Dunlap, Sexual Speech and the State: Putting
Pornography in its Place, 17 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 359, 363 n. 10 (1987).
37. Plummer argues:
[F]or narratives to flourish there must be a community to hear; that for communities
to hear, there must be stories which weave together their history, their identity, their
politics. The one-community-feeds upon and into the other-story. There is an
ongoing dynamic or dialectic of communities, politics, identities, and stories.
PLUMMER, supra note 32, at 87.
38. "Whatever else a story is, it is not simply the lived life." Id. at 168.
39. As Aristotle notes, a narrative (mythos in Greek) must have a beginning, a middle, and
an end. See ARISTOTLE'S POETICS, Ch. VII at 139 (Leon Golden trans., FSU Press 2d ed.
coming out is not always the self-construction of a narrative, as the pos-
sibility of being "outed" demonstrates. 40 My argument is that coming out
is not necessarily or fundamentally a narrative process; one may just as
easily come out in the context of nonnarrative experiences such as going
to bars or flirting or engaging in sex, although certainly those incidents
can later be narrativized.
This is the point at which I am permitted to engage in my own com-
ing out story.
I have a confession: I often find such stories tedious. Including my
own coming out narrative; especially my own narrative.
I have another confession: I am always tempted to pretend that my
own narrative is so extraordinary-extraordinarily intense, or painful, or
embarrassing, or funny, or wonderful, or even pathetic-that its special-
ness must be guarded.
This is my final confession: I am sometimes even tempted to con-
struct and tell as true an extraordinary narrative-one that is intense and
wonderful, or perhaps painful and pathetic-as long as it is interesting.
For that is narrative's ultimate imperative: to be fascinating. The
formal structures of narrative, codified since Aristotle,4" are merely tech-
niques to accomplish narrative's task of engaging our attention. This at-
tention may ultimately be erotic. In the phrasing of literary theorist Peter
Brooks, narrative is equated with desire: "Narratives both tell of de-
sire-typically present some story of desire-and arouse and make use of
desire as dynamic of signification." 42 Similarly, Teresa de Lauretis ex-
1981). Aristotle's definitions of these terms endure. A beginning is that which itself is not, by
necessity, after anything else, but after which something naturally develops. See id. An end is
the opposite: "that which is naturally after something else, either necessarily or customarily,
but after which there is nothing else." Id.
40. For discussions of "outing," see generally Susan J. Becker, The Immorality of Publicly
Outing Private People, 73 OR. L. REV. 159 (1994); John P. Elwood, Outing, Privacy, and the
First Amendment, 102 YALE L.J. 747 (1992); Jon E. Grant, "Outing" and Freedom of the Press:
Sexual Orientation's Challenge to the Supreme Court's Categorical Jurisprudence, 77
CORNELL L. REv. 103 (1991); Katheleen Guzman, About Outing: Public Discourse, Private
Lives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1531 (1995); John F. Hernandez, Outing in the 77me of AIDS: Legal
and Ethical Considerations, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 493 (1993); Barbara Moretti, Outing:
Justifiable or Unwarranted Invasion of Privacy? The Private Facts Tort as a Remedy for Dis-
closures of Sexual Orientation, 11 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 857 (1993); David H. Pollack
ed., Forced Out of the Closet: Sexual Orientation and the Legal Dilemma of "Outing," 46 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 711 (1992); Mathieu Shapiro, When Is a Conflict Really a Conflict? Outing and
the Law, 36 B.C. L. REv. 587 (1995); Ronald F. Wick, Out of the Closet and into the Head-
lines: "Outing" and the Private Facts Tort, 80 GEO. L.J. 413 (1991).
41. See ARISTOTLE'S POETIcS, supra note 39, Ch. VII at 139.
42. PETER BROOKS, READING FOR THE PLOT: DESIGN AND INTENTION IN NARRATIVE 37
(1992).
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claims that "narrative is desire"43 and Roland Barthes famously explicates
the pleasures of the text.' The correlation of narrative with desire relies
upon Freudian concepts of psychoanalysis,45 yet one need not subscribe
to psychoanalytic theories to accept the rather prosaic notion that narra-
tive's imperative is to be interesting.
legal narrativities
In the legal context, however, narrative has an additional function.
In advocacy, narrative is harnessed to the goal of success. Integral to
strategy, narrativity is a technique employed by the advocate who evalu-
ates testimony and evidence and constructs a story that will achieve the
client's desired outcome. This is nothing new: "It would hardly shock
lawyers who lived before the era of high critical theory in American aca-
demia to discover that the winner in some trials is the more sophisticated
or compelling storyteller."' While there might be many competing nar-
ratives that one could choose for a particular case, part of advocacy
training is learning to select and hone the narrative that will best achieve
the desired outcome.4 7 The advocate conveys the narrative theme in
pleadings, during the trial through questioning, and, felicitously, most
coherently during closing arguments.4" If one is successful, the narrative
43. TERESA DE LAURETIS, ALICE DOESN'T: FEMINISM, SEMIOTICS, CINEMA 140 (1984).
44. See ROLAND BARTHES, THE PLEASURE OF THE TEXT (Richard Miller trans., Hill and
Wang 1975) (1973).
45. In discussing the "close interrelation" between "desire as narrative thematic, desire as
narrative motor, and desire as the very intention of narrative language," Peter Brooks explicates
a passage from Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle, which leads to a discussion of Lacan's
explication of desire. BROOKS, supra note 42, at 54-55. Similarly, Teresa de Lauretis relies
upon Freudian concepts, especially Freud's treatment of the myth of Oedipus. See DE
LAURETIS, supra note 43, at 130-40.
46. Robert Weisberg, Proclaiming Trials as Narratives: Premises and Pretenses, in
LAw'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN LAW 61, 64 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz
eds., 1996) [hereinafter LAw's STORIES].
47. Obviously, this choice also has ethical dimensions and implicates the advocate's rela-
tionship with her or his client. For a sophisticated analysis of such problems, see generally
Naomi R. Calm, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO. L.J. 2475 (1993), and Lucie E. White, Subordi-
nation, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38
BUFF. L. REv. 1 (1990).
48. The insight that "trials always function through the framework of storytelling" is
"simple enough" but has "far-reaching implications." Robert Ferguson, Untold Stories in the
Law, in LAW'S STORIES, supra note 46, at 84.
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that one has chosen is the narrative that the jury accepts as "truth."49 On
appeal, an advocate crafts a persuasive "statement of facts" in the brief5"
and hopes that these will be reproduced as the "facts" in the judicial
opinion.5 Such narratives may be explicit and specific or may implicate
larger issues of justice. For example, in the death penalty context, an
advocate may advance a narrative that a specific client should not be exe-
cuted as well as a narrative that executions are unjust.52
Outside the litigation context, legal theorists are also enamored of
narrative. While such has always been true, in the last decade or so,
story-telling, narrativity, and autobiography have been more explicitly
proffered as scholarly methodology.53 Such scholarship is related to the
so-called law and literature movement, but as Robert Chang perceptively
notes, the distinction is that law and literature scholarship "talks about
narrative," as opposed to "doing" narrative.54 Nevertheless, before
49. Generally, but especially in a criminal trial, the "bifurcation" of the jury verdict or
judgment (guilty or not guilty) does not allow a mediation between the stories, but requires a
choice of the narrative closer to the truth. See id. at 85.
50. See, e.g., URSULA BENTELE & EVE CARY, APPELLATE ADVOCACY: PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICE 267-74 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing techniques to "predispose the court to rule in
your client's favor" including selection of facts, emphasis of facts, structuring presentation of
facts, and word choice); RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL
WRITING 304-10 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing principles of "paint[ing] the picture" for appellate
judge(s) including "[b]reathfing] life" into the facts by telling a compelling story, emphasizing
favorable facts, neutralizing unfavorable facts, and "humaniz[ing]" client); WILLIAM P.
STATSKY & R. JOHN WERNET, JR., CASE ANALYSIS AND FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL WRITING
290-92 (3d ed. 1989) (providing examples of statements of fact by opposing parties to illustrate
precept that each attorney should use "every opportunity to portray facts in a light most sympa-
thetic" to the client's position).
51. As Robert Weisberg notes, an emphasis on appellate opinions and their use of facts is
a conventional focus of law as narrative scholarship: "Numerous scholars have of late uttered
the performative affirmation of law as narrative with little more in mind than noting that the
statement of facts in an appellate case is a contestable and selective rendition of supposedly raw
data." Weisberg, supra note 46, at 66.
52. See Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 353, 365 (1996); Christopher Meade, Note, Regarding Death Sentences: The
Narrative Construction of Capital Punishment, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 732, 748-60 (1996).
53. See generally Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971
(1991); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionalists and Others: A Plea For Narrative,
87 MICH. L. REv. 2411 (1989).
54. Robert Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory,
Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1241, 1269 n.127 (1993). A
somewhat similar distinction is made by Paul Gewirtz in his piece Narrative and Rhetoric in the
Law, an introduction to the anthology LAw'S STORIES, supra note 46, at 2, which was a prod-
uct of a 1995 symposium. Gewirtz notes that although the "new academic interest in narrative
and rhetoric in law can be seen as part of a broader scholarly movement usually denominated
'law and literature,'" there is a distinction between law in literature and law as literature. See
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"doing" narrative, legal scholars have often engaged in an explanatory
exegesis of the value of narrative.55 While there are no previous specifi-
cally lesbian pieces, queer scholarly contributions have been made by
Marc Fajer,56 William Eskridge, 7 and most recently Larry CatA Backer.58
These contributions are contextualized among the work by many legal
scholars of color 9 and feminist legal scholarsq-having become loosely
grouped into a genre known as "outsider narratives."6"
Like other outsider narratives, lesbian/queer narrative legal scholar-
ship rests upon the two intertwined beliefs mentioned at the beginning of
this Article. First, it rests upon the belief that the extant legal theories
and doctrines are impoverished because they are based upon the experi-
ences only of dominant groups, those who have had the power to con-
struct the theories and doctrines. So, for example, Marc Fajer argues
that the law is based upon certain "pre-understandings" or stereotypes'
id. A less nuanced categorization is made by Richard Posner, who views the narrative turn
within legal scholarship (which he erroneously labels as narratology) simply as a "subdisci-
pline" of the law and literature movement. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Narratology, 64 U.
CHI. L. REV. 737, 737 (1997) (reviewing Law's Stories).
55. As Professor Chang himself explains in his excellent article: "before narrative can be
used in this way, a space must be created for its use in legal discourse." Chang, supra note 54,
at 1268.
56. See Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-
Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 511
(1992) [hereinafter Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?].
57. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1994).
58. See Larry Cati Backer, Constructing a "Homosexual" for Constitutional Theory: Sod-
ory Narrative, Jurisprudence, and Antipathy in United States and British Courts, 71 TUL. L.
REV. 529 (1996).
59. As Alex Johnson states,
Over the last decade, a body of scholarship known as Critical Race Theory has
emerged. Written predominantly by scholars of color, it challenges traditional legal
orthodoxy and contends that the neutral acontextual approach taken in legal scholar-
ship is seriously flawed. Furthermore, a methodological format known as Narrative
has emerged as the preferred genre of scholarship for scholars of color and others
producing Critical Race Theory. Some authorities applaud the use of Critical Race
Theory and its exposition in Narrative format, although others decry its use.
Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice of
Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA L. REv. 803,
803-04 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
60. See generally Abrams, supra note 53 (examining and defending feminist narrative le-
gal scholarship).
61. See supra note 7.
62. Fajer, supra note 56, at 524 & n.65 (citing Anthony Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty
Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2123-24 (1991)).
Fajer explains his preference for the term "pre-understanding" as used by Alfieri rather than the
term "stereotype" on the basis that pre-understanding connotes something broader and more
of queers, and that for queers ourselves to tell our stories is an effective
way to combat these stereotypes. In his ground-breaking article, Fajer
identifies three important pre-understandings "about gay people: the sex-
as-lifestyle assumption, the idea that gay issues are inappropriate for
public discussion, and the cross-gender assumption."' That such "pre-
understandings" are in fact themselves the results of narrative processes
is made clear by the work of Larry Catd Backer, who demonstrates that
gay men have been relegated by sodomy jurisprudence narratives into
categories he names "the predator," "the pied piper," "the Whore of
Babylon," and "the defiler of the public space."' Implicit in both Fa-
jer's and Backer's arguments is that such cultural and judicial categories
have been forged apart from the influence of persons known to be sexual
minorities.'
Second, queer narrative legal scholarship rests upon the belief that
the present legal landscape can be improved if we outside the dominant
group make public our experiences. In short, this belief is that lesbians
and other queers, faced with a dominant legal regime to which we are es-
sentially "foreigners," may be able to effect change in the law by telling
our stories. Thus, Fajer assembles narratives from a wide variety of
sources: personal experiences, judicial opinions, lesbian/queer texts, and
newspaper accounts, to combat the harmful pre-understandings he has
identified.6 Additionally, there is strong sentiment that succumbing to
the pressure to suppress our narratives will not ensure legal-or per-
sonal-success. 67
complex than stereotype, does not connote something necessarily negative, and is more suscep-
tible to usage in advocacy. Id. at 524 n.65.
63. Id. at 515.
64. Backer, supra note 58, at 529.
65. Although perhaps not without the influence of persons who actually were sexual mi-
norities. Cf. William Eskridge, Outsider-Insiders: The Academy of the Closet, 71 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 977, 978 (1996) (discussing the phenomenon of the closet which allows "gay people,"
(and, it would seem, especially gay men) to be considered insiders in legal academia).
66. See Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?, supra note 56, at 546-70, 591-
607, 611-14.
67. In an important, albeit brief, personal narrative, William Eskridge discusses his denial
of tenure by the University of Virginia despite his "willingness to be cooperative," discreet, and
closeted. Eskridge, supra note 57, at 644.
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reviewing the critiques of narrative legal scholarship
The genre of narrative legal scholarship has provoked rather virulent
debate. The work of some scholars of color, 68 as well as some femi-
nists, 6' became the subject of the initial critiques7' that focused on "out-
sider" narratives.71 These critiques in turn provoked compelling re-
sponses72 and subsequent practitioners of narrative scholarship seemed
compelled to engage with the critique.' While the initial critiques
68. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS
ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE (1995); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RIGHTS (1991); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teach-
ing: Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539 (1991).
69. See, e.g., Marie Ashe, Zig-Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thwughts on "Re-
production" and the Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 355 (1989); Robin West, The Difference in
Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WiS.
WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987). See also Abrams, supra note 53. Mhile generally celebrating femi-
nist narratives, Abrams seeks to evaluate them and does not engage in narrative methodology
itself. See id.
70. See, e.g., Anne M. Coughlin, Regulating the Self: Autobiographical Performances in
Outsider Scholarship, 81 VA. L. REV. 1229 (1995); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Tell-
ing Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993) [here-
inafter Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories]; Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional
Discourse, 81 GEo. L.J. 251 (1992).
71. Compare Tushnet, supra note 70, with Coughlin, supra note 70, and Farber & Sherry,
Telling Stories, supra note 70. In his critique of narrative, Tushnet discusses the work of
Catharine MacKinnon (who does not provide autobiographical narratives), the work of conser-
vative writer Stephen Carter (STEPHEN CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
BABY (1991)), the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings, and the work of Patricia Williams.
See Tushnet, supra note 70, at 261-71, 279-97. In contrast, Farber and Sherry choose as their
focus "feminist and critical race theorists," Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories, supra note 70, at
807, and Coughlin is solely interested in criticizing the autobiographical moves of those deemed
"outsiders," see Coughlin, supra note 70, at 1231-32.
72. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994);
Richard Delgado, Coughlin's Complaint: How to Disparage Outsider Writing, One Year Later,
82 VA. L. REV. 95 (1996) [hereinafter Delgado, Complaint]; Richard Delgado, On Telling Sto-
ries in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REV. 665 (1993) [hereinafter Del-
gado, In School]; Marc A. Fajer, Authority, Credibility, and Pre-Understanding: A Defense of
Outsider Narratives in Legal Scholarship, 82 GEO. L.J. 1845 (1994) [hereinafter Fajer,
Authority]; Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the
Voice of Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IowA L.
REV. 803 (1994).
73. For example, in the exciting and important work of Asian American scholars utilizing
narrative, the methodology is often not only explicated but defended. See, e.g., Chang, supra
note 54, at 1243-84; Chon, supra note 6, at 11. Of course, other Asian American legal schol-
ars utilize first-person and third-person narrative successfully without providing explications and
defense of the methodology. See, e.g., Sharon Hom, Female Infanticide in China: The Human
avoided any substantive engagement with lesbian/queer legal issues, 74 as
the debate developed it began to include work of sexual minority schol-
ars, specifically Fajer 5 and Eskridge.76 Before discussing what I con-
sider to be certain paradoxes implicated in the possibilities of les-
bian/queer narrative legal scholarship and lesbian/queer narrativity more
generally,77 I here want to indulge in a brief review of the current contro-
versy. The present terms of the debate encompass five basic arguments:
the accuracy argument, the representative argument, the special voice ar-
gument, the nonobjective argument, and the evaluative argument.
First, the accuracy argument against narrative entails the objection
that narrative, especially any purportedly autobiographical narrative, does
not allow a reader to confirm the truth of the narrative because there are
no external or objective sources readily available. The accuracy of nar-
rative is posited as important in legal scholarship because a misrepresen-
tation of events is "perilously close to what is known in other fields as
research fraud: doctoring data to fit your thesis."7  "[C]ritics have been
concerned about the risk that stories can distort the legal debate, particu-
larly if those stories are atypical, inaccurate, or incomplete." 79  Legal
academic scholarship is paralleled to litigation, in which a lawyer is not
able to offer her own testimony at trial or vouch for the credibility of a
witness, 0 and the "facts" have been subjected to an adversary process.8
Rights Specter and Thoughts Towards (An)other Vision, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 249,
249 (1992).
74. Accord, Eskridge, supra note 57, at 609 (expressing surprise at the virtual absence of
references to "gay" narratives in the original Farber and Sherry piece).
As Fajer notes, Farber and Sherry only refer to his article, Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat
Quiche Together?, supra note 56, in a footnote which grudgingly (it seems to me) accords some
validity to lesbian/queer narratives because the "phenomenon of 'closeting'" has made "infor-
mation about the lives of gay men and lesbians" "unavailable to scholars." Fajer, Authority,
supra note 72, at 1849 (quoting and citing Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories, supra note 70, at
829 n.119) (quotation marks omitted).
In responding to Eskridge, Farber and Sherry do discuss sexual minority issues. See Dan-
iel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov: Further Reflections on
Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. REv. 647, 649-52, 656-61 (1994) [hereinafter Farber &
Sherry, 200, 000 Cards].
75. See Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together, supra note 56; Fajer, Authority,
supra note 72.
76. See Eskridge, supra note 57.
77. See infra notes 127-207 and accompanying text.
78. Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories, supra note 70, at 834 (footnote omitted).
79. Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Legal Story Telling and Constitutional Law: The
Medium and the Message, in LAw's STORIEs, supra note 46, at 37, 37-38. The atypicality ar-
gument is discussed infra.
80. See Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories, supra note 70, at 835-36.
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While this epistemological anxiety' does not trouble all critics,$3 it is a
significant objection of the critics of narrative in legal scholarship.
There are several responses to the accuracy critique. One overall
theme of such responses is that the accuracy of a narrative is not compa-
rable in importance to the accuracy of empirical data. For some, the
function of the narrative in the general account determines the stress to be
placed upon issues of accuracy; 4 for others, it is not necessarily the fac-
tual accuracy but the integrity or coherence of the narrative that counts.s
Further, as Fajer points out, in law we "regularly use fictional hypotheti-
cals to further [our] analyses and engage in discussions assuming facts to
be true arguendo."' 6 Fajer also makes several concrete and constructive
suggestions to enable scholars constructing a narrative to minimize the
credibility issue.87 There seems to be an agreement that, under the as-
sumptions of narrative form, a reader may not be able to compare the
author's story with an external account of the event,8 8 but defenders of
narrative argue that stories can provide the reader with a "flash of recog-
nition." 9 Thus, while there is some agreement that narratives should be
accurate unless denominated differently," the importance of accuracy and
the methods of verification are contested.
Second, the representative argument, often discussed as a question
of typicality, disputes any claim that a narrative can reveal itself as either
customary or aberrant. This argument is composed of two intertwined
but distinct problems: the narrative may not be representative of the
81. Abrams, supra note 53, at 979.
82. See id. at 1017.
83. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 70, at 273 n.101 (stating that it is "uninteresting"
whether or not certain events as related in a narrative "actually happened" because "events like
those certainly have happened").
84. Abrams, supra note 53, at 1025-27 (distinguishing between "first person agony narra-
tives," "insider narratives," narratives that operate as metaphor for an abstract concept, and
narratives that prompt a flash of self-recognition).
85. While Tushnet's critique certainly implicates questions of credibility, accord Fajer,
Authority, supra note 72, at 1859-60, his explicit argument concentrates on questions of literary
style. See Tushnet, supra note 70, at 251.
86. Fajer, Authority, supra note 72, at 1864.
87. Id. at 1863 (suggesting adherence to the duty to be accurate, a willingness to discuss
the narrative if questioned, and the presentation of additional evidence).
88. Abrams, supra note 53, at 1024.
89. Id. at 1023.
90. As Jane Baron notes, "even as storytelling's proponents contest particular definitions"
of truthfulness, they share the concerns over credibility. Baron, supra note 72, at 280 n.169
(citations omitted). Baron suggests that by accepting the validity of concerns about accuracy,
"storytellers do not escape, and may inadvertently lend force to, the empiricist assumptions of
many of their critics." Id. at 280-81 n.169.
writer's other experiences; and even if the narrative is representative of
the writer's experiences, it may not be representative of the experiences
of other (similarly situated) people. The critique again interprets narra-
tive as empirical data and questions whether it is "statistically signifi-
cant."91 A powerful narrative may become particularly suspect because
"individuals assume that dramatic or easily remembered events are typi-
cal," which means that people have a tendency to "overestimate the like-
lihood" of such an event and likewise overestimate the prevalence of such
an event in the experiences of other members of the population.' In
short, people stereotype. 93
However, if Fajer and others are correct that one function of narra-
tive is to combat stereotypes,' then the criticism that a narrative may not
be representative is largely irrelevant. In other words, even if the narra-
tive is considered to be a singular event in an unusual person, it can op-
erate to undermine the stereotype. Additionally, the tendency toward
typicality, likelihood, and prevalence is counterbalanced by a certain
status quo solipsism. As Robert Chang expresses it, because people have
convinced themselves that the ugliness of racism does not exist, at least in
blatant forms, they can dismiss Chang's narratives of discrimination
against him as a Korean American as "isolated incidents."' Thus, critics
and supporters of narrative in legal scholarship have divergent opinions
about whether representativeness is an appropriate criteria of assessment.
Third, and linked to the issue of the ability of a writer to represent
members of her "group," critics dispute any claim that any group of nar-
rators possess a special "voice."' In this view, outsider and narratives
become fused, although not all "outsider" scholars practice narrative and
not all practitioners of narrative are outsiders.' Critics reject any claim
91. Abrams, supra note 53, at 1028 (stating the existence of such criticism rather than ad-
vancing it).
92. Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories, supra note 70, at 839.
93. See id.
94. See Fajer, Authority, supra note 72, at 1847. Accord Robert Hayman, Jr. & Nancy
Levit, The Tales of White Folk: Doctrine, Narrative, and the Reconstruction of Racial Reality,
84 CAL. L. REv. 377, 398-99 (1996) (review essay).
95. Chang, supra note 54, at 1274.
96. The combination of the representative argument with the "voice" argument places any
narrator with a group identity (which I suggest would be every narrator) between Scylla and
Charybdis. Either the narrator is not representative of her group, in which case her narrative
should be dismissed as aberrant, or else she is claiming to possess a special group "voice"
which does not exist.
97. Legal scholarship that is not "outsider" under conventional definitions, see supra note
7, explicitly employs and esteems narrative. For example, in Constructing the Insurance Rela-
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tionship: Sales Stories, Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV.
1395, 1396-98 (1994), Professor Tom Baker argues,
Like King Lear and King Richard III, these insurance stories work by organizing ex-
perience into a narrative structure that has a recognizable and predictable outcome.
For example, if the story we are told about an insurance claim is one with a greedy
and dishonest insured (Richard), we understand and applaud a careful, detailed inves-
tigation by the insurance company; if the story is one with a dependent, vulnerable in-
sured (Lear), we may see in that investigation delay and extortion.
Typically, we use these insurance stories as advocacy tools, to persuade another
to do what we want, whether that is buying insurance, accepting the denial of a claim,
or deciding a case in our favor. But these insurance stories have another use-a use
that, while not unrelated to advocacy, aims more at understanding the insurance rela-
tionship. The stories we tell about insurance reveal our vision of the insurance rela-
tionship, including the promises and obligations of that relationship. While the stories
I tell may be of interest to my students, the stories that insurance companies tell are of
far greater interest. These stories reveal a vision of the insurance relationship that
should matter to courts asked to determine the obligations that inhere in that relation-
ship.
Lawyers already use the stories insurance companies tell as a source of obliga-
tion. As excerpts from some judicial opinions reveal, judges do too-as they should.
It is through these stories that insurance companies tell people what to expect from in-
surance, insurance companies, and insurance claims. Examining these stories, and the
competing visions of insurance that they project, can help judges decipher the unwrit-
ten obligations of the insurance relationship. Moreover, analyzing the way judges use
the stories can serve another, equally important purpose, that of understanding the
doctrinal lines drawn in insurance cases.
Insurance companies tell two different sets of stories about insurance at two dis-
tinct points in the insurance relationship. When marketing their services, insurance
companies tell what I will call "sales stories." This first set of stories, drawn from
insurance advertising, responds to the fears of dependency that are epitomized by King
Lear. When handling claims, insurance companies tell a second set of stories, which
I will call "claims stories." This second set of stories, drawn from fieldwork with
adjusters and from insurance adjustment trade literature, stresses the need to protect
the insurance fund from overreaching, as dramatized (perhaps overdramatized) by
King Richard IlL These two sets of stories evoke quite different visions of the insur-
ance relationship. The continuing trouble of the courts in defining the obligations of
the insurance relationship stems in part from this duality, which is also apparent in ju-
dicial opinions. In the abstract at least, both visions are equally "right" (and just as
equally "wrong"). Yet, the choice of lens can determine whether the insured in a
particular case is seen as poor King Lear or wicked King Richard.
Id. at 1396-98 (footnotes omitted). This example is not unique. See, e.g., Thomas E. Kauper,
Antitrust in 1992: The Year of the Storyteller, 61 ANTrIRUST L.J. 347 (1993); Deborah A.
Stone, Promises and Public Trust: Rethinking Insurance Law Through Stories, 72 TEx. L.
REv. 1435 (1994).
Similarly, a state court appellate judge contends that state constitutional interpretation "in-
volves the process of discovering, remaking, and retelling narratives" and that a "lucid under-
standing of the nature of this narrative process is essential." Barry R. Schaller, Getting the Sto-
ries Right: Reflections on Narrative Voice in State Constitutional Interpretation, 26 CoNN. L.
REV. 671, 671-72 (1994). Prosecutors in criminal cases have also recognized the power of nar-
rative, as the use of victim impact statements has demonstrated. See, e.g., Susan Brandes, Em-
pathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361 (1996). Law profes-
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that an outsider narrative has a claim that it is based upon group experi-
ences, because there is neither a distinct nor unitary voice possessed by
any group."s Critics use theories of social constructionism and anti-
essentialism, developed by many outsider theorists themselves, to dispute
the existence of any coherent perspective possessed by any particular
group.' Defenders, in fact, may agree: some defenders of narrative
aver that "voice" is an "unfortunate metaphor""°° or a "false issue." 01
Alex Johnson, however, in supporting a "Voice of Color," argues that
"voice" is not some essentialist possession, but a result of the social con-
struction of the categories of race itself; the "Voice of Color" is thus
"socially constructed as different or minority-as 'other' or 'them,' never
as 'same' or 'us. '  Or, as Jane Baron contends, one need not assert
the "existence of any essentially different voice" to explain why those
who lack power, or who represent people who do, might be particularly
focused "on one of power's most important forms, the story. " " Thus,
sors often use stories as well. See, e.g., Beryl Blaustone, Teaching Evidence: Storytelling in
the Classroom, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 453 (1992).
Further, the stories told by law professors, judges, and lawyers can be quite autobiographi-
cal, and prosecutors and law enforcement officers also engage in personal narratives. See, e.g.,
MARCIA CLARK, WITHOUT A DOUBT (1997); WILLIAM DUNN, BOOT: AN LAPD OFFICER'S
ROOKIE YEAR (1996); SOL WACHTLER, AFTER THE MADNESS: A JUDGE'S OWN PRISON
MEMOIR (1997); Dan Edwards, Reflections on Three Stories: "Practicing" Law and Christian-
ity at the Same ime, 27 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1105 (1996).
Outside of the legal realm, there has been a marked turn toward narrative autobiography,
especially in the form of the memoir. See James Atlas, The Age of the Literary Memoir is Now,
N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1996, § 6 (Magazine), at 25; William Gass, The Art of Self. Autobiog-
raphy in an Age of Narcissism, HARPER'S, May 1994, at 43, 48-52. Further, "moi criticism"
has become a staple of academia. See Adam Begley, The I's Have It, LINGUA FRANCA,
March-April 1994, at 54, 54 (focusing on Duke University but noting that "[a]utobiography is
the lastest wave, and not just at Duke"). This trend has produced not only articles and single
volumes, but anthologies devoted to the purpose of exploring and defending personal writing as
scholarly. See, e.g., CONFESSIONS OF THE CRITICS (H. Aram Veeser ed., 1996).
Thus, although as Richard Delgado notes, majoritarian stories may not seem like stories at
all but simply truth, see Delgado, In School, supra note 72, at 666, explicit celebration and em-
ployment of narrative is not limited to outsiders.
Moreover, not all-or even most-outsider scholarship is narrative. In evaluating an an-
notated bibliography of critical race theory that he co-authored, Delgado notes that "[a]t most,
one-quarter of the works could be described as written in the storytelling or narrative mode."
Id. at 669. An analysis of feminist legal scholarship, as well as lesbian/queer legal scholarship,
would produce a similar result.
98. See Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories, supra note 70, at 809-19.
99. See Farber & Sherry, 200,000 Cards, supra note 74, at 651-52.
100. Fajer, Authority, supra note 72, at 1853.
101. Delgado, In School, supra note 72, at 669.
102. Johnson, supra note 59, at 832-33.
103. Baron, supra note 72, at 266 (footnote omitted).
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both supporters and critics of narrative may seek to distance themselves
from the sin of essentialism. In this distancing, there does seem to be at
least a superficial agreement that "outsider" narratives are not special
simply because they are written by persons who are members of what
might be described as outsider groups. Nevertheless, supporters of out-
sider narrative would maintain that group membership can be important
and that a narrative can demonstrate the significance of group member-
ship. 1
04
Fourth, critics raise arguments concerning the nonobjective nature of
narrative. In some sense, the nonobjectivity argument underlies the criti-
cisms of narratives with regard to accuracy, representation, and voice.105
This criticism implicitly contrasts narrative with logical argument, im-
plying that narrative is flawed because it is not capable of an authoritative
interpretation. Yet within the debate, this argument has a rather unique
twist, devolving into a claim by critics that although practitioners of out-
sider narratives claim their texts are susceptible to multiple meanings, the
practitioners themselves insist upon a singularly correct interpretation. 6
This argument is related to another nonobjectivity argument: that
narratives, especially personal ones, foreclose rather than enhance schol-
arly (objective) debate. In this view, the inclusion of a personal narrative
makes it difficult to challenge the author's point without questioning the
author's "emotional stability or veracity""0 7 or seeing one's challenge
construed as an ad hominem attack." 8 In response, defenders of narra-
104. See Fajer, Authority, supra note 72, at 1855.
105. C. Abrams, supra note 53, at 1013 (stating that "[c]hallenges to the 'truth' or 'typi-
cality' of narratives... reflect the evaluative premises of objectivity").
106. See Coughlin, supra note 70, at 1311 (arguing that the structure and "apology" quality
of Patricia Williams' narratives constrict "readers' interpretive room" and have a "potent coer-
cive effect on readers" to "endorse Williams's interpretation of the experience"); Farber &
Sherry, 200,000 Cards, supra note 74, at 656 ("[]nside [the supporters of narrative's] prag-
matic and social constructionist arguments against objectivity, we find reinscribed the very
foundationalism and belief in objectivity that they reject. Many of those who reject objective
truth exhibit a contradictorily high level of confidence when engaged in the task of interpreta-
tion.").
107. Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories, supra note 70, at 836.
108. See Coughlin, supra note 70, at 1281. As Coughlin asserts:
[P]ersonal stories tend to pre-empt responses other than sympathy or silence, precisely
because any critical commentary or desire for clarification may be dismissed as ad
hominem-and any criticism necessarily is ad hominem, since the material available
for criticism or clarification is the scholar's personal experience. Ironically, there-
fore, the power of the autobiographical exchange to inspire readers' sympathy turns
out to be a significant shortcoming within the context of an academy whose partici-
pants, even when sympathetic to an idea, are committed to immediate, often
tive point to the very existence of the critical scholarship giving rise to
such arguments to defeat the claim that such criticism is foreclosed, 1"
and note that "[c]onsiderable scholarly discussion exists regarding the
work of scholars who . . . employ narratives extensively."110 More spe-
cifically, Marc Fajer outlines a number of civil and scholarly responses
that could be made by those who are skeptical about a particular narra-
tive.111
In sum, while questions of objectivity are implicated in the other
criticisms of narrative, the struggles regarding objectivity are not simply
between those professing an objective stance and those asserting that all
stances are contingent. Rather, arguments regarding interpretative
authority and the conditions of scholarly debate reflect very different
postulations of the academic enterprise and the legal scholarly "commu-
nity."
The last argument also involves issues rather exclusive to the acad-
emy. The evaluative argument, or what I would prefer to name the ten-
ure difficulty, expresses doubts about whether narrative scholarship can
meet the criteria of "excellence" employed by academic arbiters-arbiters
who have the power to award tenure, as well as to make decisions re-
garding promotion and initial faculty appointments-and if so, under what
criteria." 2 Critics of narrative argue that the claim of some theorists, that
traditional criteria should not apply to narrative, contains several unsus-
tainable contentions. First, according to these critics, aesthetic consid-
erations cannot be determinative because the focus of the legal academy
is law and not literature.1 Second, a claim that "outsider" narratives
face-to-face, critical inquiry and debate. By rejecting any critical reaction as a treach-
erous failure of sympathy for the author's pain, if not as the product of prejudiced ig-
norance, and dismissing criticism as a personal attack on the author's character, auto-
biographical rhetoric is no less coercive of readers than the legal rhetoric that the
outsiders desire to supersede.
Id. at 1281-82 (footnotes omitted).
109. Delgado, Complaint, supra note 72, at 101-02.
110. Fajer, Authority, supra note 72, at 1857.
111. Id.
112. See Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories, supra note 70, at 840. The authors note, how-
ever, that there are disputes within the legal academy regarding the evaluation of scholarship,
even apart from questions regarding narrative. See id.
113. See id. at 845 ("In rejecting the creation of literature as a form of legal scholarship,
we are admittedly indulging a mild presumption in favor of institutional specialization."). Cf.
Tushnet, supra note 70, at 251-52 (stating that "constitutional discourse succeeds when its
authors use the persuasive power of their self-presentations by means of an effective literary
style"); Mark Tushnet, The Death of an Author, by Himself, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 111, 111-
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should be judged according to their "ability to advance the interests of the
outsider community" 114 is akin to a political litmus test.115 The confusion
of scholarship with politics is not necessarily transformative, but "can be
merely tragic." 1 6 And third, any claim that traditional evaluative stan-
dards are biased, or are inapplicable to certain persons, is beyond discus-
sion. " 7 The lowest common denominator of agreement regarding stan-
dards applicable to the evaluation of narrative within the legal academy
might be that narratives in the context of legal scholarship should some-
how be related to legal concerns.
Obviously, disputes involving tenure, promotion, and even initial
appointment, can lead to ugly conflicts within a law school as well as
within any larger university in which a law school might be established.
In an attempt to forestall such difficulties, Arthur Austin has sought to
situate narrative scholarship within the three stages of legal scholarship-
vocational, doctrinal, and interdisciplinary-and to remind us that legal
scholarship is a relatively new field. 18 Given such a background, the
implicit suggestion is that legal academics need to be less defensive and
less critical and begin the work of formulating concrete standards. Aus-
tin proffers his own criteria: that the scholarship must deliver the mes-
sage with clarity; that the scholarship must "add something to the existing
body of knowledge"; that the scholarship opens or is part of an ongoing
dialogue; and that specifically narrative scholarship must satisfy the aes-
thetic requirements of narrative qua narrative. 19 Austin elaborates these
criteria and applies them to specific examples, making his project practi-
cally useful for his goal of contributing to the making of an effective re-
sponse to the "deepening fragmentation of scholars into special interest
12 (1994) (discussing the link between authoritative precedent and literary style, as well as judi-
cial integrity and literary style).
114. Coombs, supra note 7, at 713.
115. In criticizing Coombs' touchstone for evaluating scholarship, Farber and Sherry state:
[I]t imposes a single ideological veneer on a broad spectrum of scholarship. Only
those who agree both on the problems facing the outsider community and on the poli-
cies that count as solutions will have their work evaluated positively. Thus, a person
of color whose scholarship attacks the notion of a voice of color (or affirmative ac-
tion) as dangerous to the community of color is likely to be judged harshly by
Coombs' standard.
Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories, supra note 70, at 843.
116. Farber & Sherry, 200,000 Cards, supra note 74, at 655.
117. See Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories, supra note 70, at 842 (dismissing argument that
standards might be inappropriate with a reference to "promotion and tenure").
118. See Arthur Austin, Evaluating Storytelling as a ype of Nontraditional Scholarship, 74
NEB. L. REV. 479, 480 (1995).
119. Id. at 515-23.
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groups."'" Yet, however "concrete" the standards, they cannot pave
over the fundamental disagreement between critics and practitioners of
narrative, particularly outsider narrative. For critics, the academic proj-
ect is a greater "understanding" of law;... for supporters of outsider nar-
rative, the project is one of changing the law.22
The foregoing outline of the debate surrounding narrative in legal
scholarship, and specifically outsider narratives, is a necessary back-
ground for any discussion of lesbian/queer legal narratives. While the
critiques of narrative make some interesting points and have opened up a
discussion, I do not find the critiques of narrative compelling, and often
find them reactionary"z and rude. 4 Nevertheless, I do have some con-
cerns about relying upon narrativity as a strategy to accomplish progres-
sive legal change relating to lesbian/queer issues. My misgivings encom-
pass narrative as used in legal scholarship, but also in the theorizing that
occurs in places other than academic law reviews, as well as narrative
more generally. As I hope is clear, I write as one who is enmeshed in
narrative, both in legal scholarship"z and in traditionally narrative forms
such as the novel.'2 6 Further, I depart from the contours of the current
critiques with their binary attentiveness to a presumed opposition between
narrative and logical argument, which probably have more in common
with each other than lyricism-and certainly nonlinguistic communica-
tion-has with either.
My trepidation is derived from the possibility that a reliance upon
narrative may undermine what we seek to accomplish because of certain
paradoxes of narrativity. These paradoxes relate to the masculin-
ity/heterosexuality of narrative structure itself, the ubiquity of narrative,
the contrast of narrativity with feminist consciousness-raising, the inter-
120. Id. at 527-28.
121. Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories, supra note 70, at 809, 819, 824.
122. See Delgado, In School, supra note 72, at 673-74.
123. Thus, I agree with the description of the "hotly contested area of debate" surrounding
the use of narrative in the legal academy as being "between those who support the status quo
and those who oppose it." Culp, supra note 7, at 70.
124. Although there is certainly rudeness on both sides. Accord, Baron, supra note 72, at
259 ("The tone of the debate on the issue of standards used to evaluate nondoctrinal scholarship
at times seems to veer from vehement, to, well, nasty."); Farber & Sherry, 200,00 Cards, su-
pra note 74, at 647 n.1 (discussing a "caustic" exchange and noting that the disagreement can
"degenerate into intellectual fratricide").
125. As the present Article demonstrates. But cf. infra note 192.
126. See, e.g., RUTHANN ROBSON, A/K/A (1997) (novel); RUTHANN ROBSON, ANOTHER
MOTHER (1995) (novel); RUTHANN ROBSON, CECILE (1991) (short stories); RUTHANN
ROBSON, EYE OF A HURRICANE (1989) (short fiction).
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play between individual and collective narratives, the tendency of narra-
tives to provoke counter-narratives, the lure of self-censorship, and fi-
nally the fact that we may be at the end of the period in which narrativity
is a relevant undertaking.
seven paradoxes
1. First, it may be paradoxical-and unworkable-to use narrative
to advance lesbian/queer liberation because narrative itself may be ines-
capably male and heterosexual. For those theorists who rely upon psy-
choanalytic models of narrative as equatable to desire, this desire is con-
structed as male. As Teresa de Lauretis notes, it is male desire that
structures narrativity and results in its singular plot: the male hero's
quest which has a woman as the reward/object. 27 The heterosexuality of
this model is made more explicit by lesbian theorist Judith Roof, who ar-
gues that "our very understanding of narrative as a primary means to
sense and satisfaction depends upon a metaphorically heterosexual dy-
namic within a reproductive aegis."" 2  Roof is not arguing that there
cannot be narratives with lesbian content, or even narratives with "posi-
tive" lesbian content, but rather that the structure of narrative is inelucta-
bly male and heterosexual. This may explain some of the dissatisfaction
with the revolutionary potential of lesbian/queer narratives, 129 even when
such narratives seek to disrupt sex or gender categories. 30 As Roof
127. DE LAuRETs, supra note 43, at 103-56.
128. ROOF, supra note 33, at xxii.
129. In spite of my participation in the production of lesbian literature and my enjoyment of
many lesbian narratives, both fictional and not, the nagging rhetorical questions which Judith
Roof poses have a regretful resonance:
Why is the story always the same? Why, no matter how sympathetic, clever, radical,
or well-meaning the author, the circumstance, the occasion, is the story of the lesbian
always really the same old story and her fate the same old, vaguely oppressed fate
whether she is the protagonist or a minor character? Why am I rarely happy with any
narrative that represents or suggests the presence of lesbian sexuality?
Id. at xxvi.
I would add, however, that I am even more rarely happy with any narrative that does not
represent the presence of lesbian sexuality.
130. For example, Susan S. Lanser, in her article Queering Narratology, celebrates the
novel JEANETTE WINTERSON, WRrrrEN ON THE BODY (1992), in which the protagonist is hav-
ing an affair with a married woman, but the sex/gender of the protagonist is never clarified.
Susan Lanser, Queering Narratology, in AMBIGUOUS DISCOURSE: FEMINIST NARRATOLOGY
AND BRITISH WOMEN WRITERS 250 (Kathy Mezei ed., 1996). Yet Lanser's argument is decid-
edly modest:
My point is that sex, gender, and sexuality constitute narratologically significant ele-
ments that intersect with other textual elements to illuminate "the nature, form, and
states: "Something in the way we understand what a story is in the first
place or something in the way narrative itself operates produces narra-
tive's 'heterosexually friendly' shape."' While not invoking objections
of masculinity or heterosexuality, Fredric Jameson's analysis of the
"commodification" of narrative is pertinent.' In Jameson's analysis,
narrative's arrangement into beginning-middle-end is a reifying and
consumptive structure whereby the end determines every portion of the
narrative, which portions are themselves consumed under the narrative
beginning-middle-end model.' 34 If Roof is correct in her assertion that
narrativity only tolerates lesbianism in its perverse middle,'35 then Jame-
son's insight about the relative irrelevance of every aspect other than the
end means that lesbians can exist as consumable objects within narrative
but that our existence cannot be narrativity's end/purpose. Thus, al-
though we may believe that narrative is preferable to doctrinal rules for
accomplishing favorable legal change for lesbians and other queers, it
may be that narrative is as male and heterosexual a structure as rationalist
legalism.
2. A second and related paradox is that the oppositional stance of
narrative may not be oppositional at all. Barthes has famously stated that
"narrative is international, transhistorical, transcultural: it is simply
there, like life itself." 
13
Similarly, Hayden White has stated that to even "raise the question
of narrative itself is to invite reflection on the very nature of culture and,
possibly, even on the nature of humanity itself." 137 By using narratives,
we often believe we are presenting a specific account as distinct from an
abstract theory, but the very structure of narrative may be undermining
functioning of narrative," to describe commonalities and differences among narra-
tives, and to account for readers' "ability to produce and understand them."
Id. at 258.
131. ROOF, supra note 33, at xxxii.
132. FREDRIC JAMESON, Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture, in SIGNATURES OF THE
VISIBLE 9, 13 (1992).
133. See ARISTOTLE'S POETIcs, supra note 39, Ch. VII at 139.
134. Jameson describes the adventure tale in which the denouement is a reifying structure
which "reaches down into the very page-by-page detail of the book's composition" so that each
chapter, and even each paragraph, is a sub-plot (presumably complete with its own beginning,
middle, and end), thus transforming the "transparent flow of language as much as possible into
material images and objects we can consume." JAMESON, supra note 132, at 13.
135. ROOF, supra note 33, at 39.
136. ROLAND BARTHES, Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives, in IMAGE,
MUSIC, TEXT 79 (Stephen Heath ed. & trans., Hill and Wang 1977) (1977).
137. Hayden White, The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality, in ON
NARRATIVE 1-2 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1990).
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its content, no matter how distinctive. As Judith Roof argues, narrative
"is a structural defense against a chaotic world"1 3' and in its attempt to
impose order it may be more like a logical system than not.
The beginning-middle-end structure of narrative is the same struc-
ture employed in Enlightenment and modernist pursuits of history, eco-
nomics, science, and law. For example, one of Hegel's central notions
was that "history is the story of the development of human freedom."
139
This development is inextricably bound to law and the formation of the
nation-state, which in fact enables the conditions for narrativity. As
Robert Weisberg explicates Hegel's view:
Only where there is law can there be a subject or kind of event that
lends itself to narrative, or a legal subject to serve as the agent, agency,
and subject of historical narrative. The urge to tell stories derives ei-
ther from a desire for national law and order or a desire to challenge
that law and order .... Hence, narrative deals with law, legality, le-
gitimacy, or more generally authority. The desire to narrate is the de-
sire to represent authority, whose legitimacy depends on establishing
certain grounding facts.140
Such philosophizing, indeed all of Hegel's philosophizing, typifies the
grand narrative or metanarrative that postmodernism rejects. 141 Postmod-
ernism's rejection, however, does not encompass "smaller" narratives,
which are often celebrated as a method to oppose scientific, abstract, or
even legal systems. 42
Yet these smaller narratives-by being narratives-replicate the
structure of the grand narratives being rejected, albeit on a smaller scale:
my afternoon at a lesbian bar is substituted for the global human struggle
toward freedom. Yet even my small story of my afternoon at a lesbian
bar requires me to "emplot the events according to the principles in-
forming the structures of distinctive story types or genres." 143 This so-
138. ROOF, supra note 33, at xxxi.
139. WALTER KAUFMAN, HEGEL: A REINTERPRETATION 250 (1966). Kaufman states that
this idea is "at the heart" of Hegel's philosophy of history and that all else receives blood from
it. Id.
140. Weisberg, supra note 46, at 77-78.
141. JEAN-FRANI;OIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON
KNOWLEDGE xxiv (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1984)
(1979) ("Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarra-
tives.").
142. See generally, HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT OF FORM: NARRATIVE DISCOURSE
AND HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION (1987).
143. Hayden White, Storytelling: Historical and Ideological, in CENTURIES' ENDS,
NARRATIVE MEANS 58, 69 (Robert Newman ed., 1996).
called emplotment-structuring the events with a beginning, middle, and
end-will occur whether I later write the afternoon as a fictional scene,
whether I later "truthfully" narrate "what I did today" to my lover, or
perhaps even as I remain silent but simply understand/remember that spe-
cific afternoon at that specific bar. What I am suggesting is that it may
be the very act of emplotment, the narrativizing itself, that is problem-
atic, rather than simply the scale or subject of the narrative.
Just as narrative seems transhistorical, transcultural, and even "natu-
ral," so too does domination and subjection. What if there is a link be-
tween the structures of narrative and the structures of domination?
In other words, what if a condition of lesbian emancipation is a state
without a necessary end? Or as Roof expresses it, a rejection of narrative
may allow us to understand what has always been there but which we
have left uncounted because it did not lead to "closure or production. " "
Or perhaps even more radical, what if the condition of lesbian/queer
emancipation is a state without any end? If "[e]very story is over before
it begins" because narratives "report a completed past they cannot al-
ter," 45 then lesbian/queer liberation in the here-and-now may demand a
rejection of narrative.
3. A third, and less abstract, paradox of narrative in legal scholar-
ship is elucidated by a comparison with feminist consciousness-raising.
Although narrativity makes a claim to experience, it is not utilized in le-
gal scholarship in the same way that the feminist process of conscious-
ness-raising is utilized to encourage one to recognize one's own life.1"
Instead, narrativity is often proffered as a process in which one requests
the listener's empathy.147 It is thus based upon difference rather than
likeness. It asks that the listener reject his/her own experience and re-
place it with the experience of another person, the teller of the tale. Yet
perhaps we listen to the stories of others only to fortify the narratives we
have constructed for ourselves. According to the writer and critic Char-
les Baxter:
[W]e are like Ivan Illych's friends who, upon hearing of his death,
think: Well, at least it wasn't me. We seem to know ourselves, so-
144. ROOF, supra note 33, at 187.
145. MICHAEL ROEMER, TELLING STORIES: POSTMODERNISM AND THE INVALIDATION OF
TRADITIONAL NARRATIVE 3 (1995).
146. This is not to say that this does not occur.
147. See generally Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574
(1987).
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cially at least, only by comparing ourselves to someone else, to others.
We knit together what comparative context we can.
In day-to-day life we play these little games of comparison-contrast
in which we are usually the contrast. I wouldn't have done it that way.
I wouldn't have done that at all. Look at him, the one who did it,
sinking. At least it wasn't me! By telling stories in this manner, we be-
come narratable. We find a story for ourselves. We spin around our-
selves, in what seems to be a natural form, the cobweb of a plot. We
move our own lives into the condition of narrative progression. 
148
Even if Baxter is only partially correct, what his insight demon-
strates is that a lesbian/queer narrative intended to promote understanding
may have the effect of making a listener more smug about his or her het-
erosexuality. As Lucie White notes, practices of empathy (such as ac-
quiring knowledge about another person) are often also practices of
domination. 149 Thus, we may believe that telling our lesbian/queer stories
has inspired empathy, but what we have gotten is pity. From my per-
spective, pity is not only insufficient, it is unwelcome.
Even more bleak is the possibility that empathy is unachievable. In
his work on narrativity and intelligence, Roger Schank posits that a lis-
tener's "understanding" is a process of "mapping the speaker's stories
onto the listener's stories": "Since we can only understand things that
relate to our own experiences, it is actually very difficult to hear things
that people say to us that are not interpretable through those experi-
ences." 150 Thus, to the extent our lesbian/queer narratives are not capa-
ble of being mapped onto pre-existing narratives, they are unintelligible.
To the extent our lesbian/queer narratives are mapped, they may become
something other than lesbian/queer.
4. A fourth paradoxical effect of our reliance upon narrative is the
effect that it can have on our communities and movements. A reliance
upon the narratives of individual experience as a touchstone can lead to a
148. CHARLES BAXTER, Counterpointed Characterization, in BURNING DOWN THE HOUSE:
ESSAYS ON FICTION 109, 112 (1997).
The reference is to Leo Tolstoy's classic story, The Death of Ivan Illych, which writer and
critic Vladimir Nabokov calls "Tolstoy's most artistic, most perfect, and most sophisticated
achievement." VLADIMIR NABOKOV, LECTUREs ON RUSSIAN LITERATURE 238 (Fredson Bow-
ers ed., 1981). As the story opens, Ivan Illych is dead, but the "unfeeling vulgarity of the bu-
reaucratic middle-class city life in which so recently Ivan himself had participated" continues
and his "civil service colleagues think of how his death will affect their careers" and what pro-
motions it might occasion. Id. at 239.
149. Lucie E. White, Seeking ". . . The Faces of Otherness ... ": A Response to Pro-
fessors Sarat, Felstiner, and Cahn, 77 CORNELL L.REv. 1499, 1508-09 (1992).
150. ROGER C. SCHANK, TELL ME A STORY: NARRATIvE AND INTELLIGENCE 57 (1990).
solipsism that separates us from each other and inhibits understanding of
operations of power."' For example, our discussions theorizing impor-
tant issues such as same-sex marriage begin-and often end-with state-
ments about the specific effect it would have (or not have) given one's
present situation. Compare these two statements:
I support gay marriage because my lover has a good insurance plan
and I am self-employed, and I need the insurance because when I was
ill last year and had to go to the hospital the bill was outrageous, and if
we were heterosexual and married I would have been covered by my
lover's insurance.
I don't support gay marriage because I just broke up with my lover
and if we had to go through a divorce it would have been terrible, just
like it was when I was heterosexual and my husband and I divorced and
he took me to the cleaners, getting the house that I had worked hard to
fix up.
Such statements are collapsed narratives, often approved because of
their specificity and grounding in personal experience. Further, neither
speaker is presuming to speak for any community, the existence of which
is contestable at best. The "end" of each statement-the political position
in support or not of same-sex marriage-is narrativized by the preceding
incidents related by the speaker. These narratives, both structurally and
in their appeal to personal experience, can preclude logical argument,
152
and may, more importantly, preclude each other and a collective politics.
Personal narratives may seem more specific, contingent, and con-
tested than Hegelian grand narratives or Aristotelian logics, but they can
be equally essentializing. This essentializing movement is bound with
psychoanalytic structures, processes, and language.1 53  As Kenneth
Plummer argues in his study of sexual stories,
151. While the discussion of this paradox can be related to the argument that autobiographi-
cal displays by outsiders may replicate rather than challenge liberalism's construction of the in-
dividual, I do not assume that liberalism's constructs of rights-possessing individuals should be
abandoned by "outsiders" seeking equality. But see Coughlin, supra note 70, at 1231-32.
Moreover, I am not suggesting that lesbianlqueer practitioners of narrative are unaware of this
paradox or that "community" is not as problematic a concept as individuality.
152. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
153. Although I focus here on structural issues, the importance of the use of specific lan-
guage to encapsulate experience in narrative cannot be underestimated. As Kenneth Plummer
correctly stresses, narrative is socially constructed not only in its structures, but in the specifics,
such as the language utilized. PLUMMER, supra note 32, at 168-69. In illustrating this point,
Plummer recounts the wonderful narrative by the writer Samuel Delaney about his own narra-
tion of his coming out experience. As Delaney expresses it, his first public acknowledgment of
his homosexuality occurred in a therapy group at the age of 22. See Samuel R. Delaney & Jo-
seph Beam, Samuel R. Delaney: The Possibility of Possibilities, in IN THE LIFE: A BLACK
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Therapy provides a major instance of the power of essentialising stories
in personal lives, where sexual stories weave together past, present and
future into an identity. They help to clarify personal problems, the
story lending a (maybe only momentary) coherence to a life....
[N]arrative plays a key role in the healing process. It can provide an-
swers to the questions 'Why me?' . . . and also 'What can be done?"- 4
This invocation of the therapeutic is not arbitrary, especially for lesbians.
As one national survey has reported, three out of every four lesbians in
the United States have been in therapy at some point in their lives.155
Even if this statistic is inflated, over the last two decades, therapy has
gained prominence in "Western middle classes and leftist liberal commu-
nities in general," and certainly among lesbians. 56 While once lesbians,
queers, and feminists opposed the discipline of psychology on political
grounds, now psychology seems to have subordinated politics. As Celia
Kitzinger and Rachel Perkins argue in their book, Changing Our Minds,
the political goal of changing the world has been replaced by "the thera-
peutic goal of changing ourselves."'5 7 Thus, the exploration of the ques-
tions "Why me?" and "What can be done?" does not lead to an explora-
tion of common conditions or of political, economic, or legal structures,
as in the process of consciousness-raising."58 Instead, there is the devel-
opment of healing personal narratives. Violence against women is ad-
dressed through anger-management counseling for rapists, racism be-
comes "something to get off your chest in a counseling workshop," and
oil spills are remediated by hiring a counselor for the affected persons.5 9
Legal, economic, and political patterns that enforce subordination of
GAY ANTHOLOGY 196 (Joseph Beam ed., 1986). Reflecting that same evening on his narrative,
Delaney noted that inside the group, he had talked like "someone miserable, troubled, and sick
over being gay," when he in fact believed that "the gay aspects of his life from the social to the
sexual, were the most educational, the most supportive, the most creative" parts of his life. Id.
Delaney realized that the discrepancy between his language and his understanding was a result
of using the "public language" contained in the texts he had read that had pathologized homo-
sexuality. Id. at 196-97. Thus, to be expressible, at least initially, Delaney's narrative had to
comport with the narratives he had previously learned. Interestingly, Delaney attributes his
ability to compare the language he had used in the therapeutic setting with his understanding of
his experience as "a writer." Id. at 197.
154. PLUMMER, supra note 32, at 173.
155. See CELIA KITZINGER & RACHEL PERKINS, CHANGING OUR MINDS: LESBIAN
FEMINISM AND PSYCHOLOGY 73 (1993) (citing JUDITH B. BRADFORD, NATIONAL LESBIAN
HEALTH CARE SURVEY: MENTAL HEALTH IMPLICATIONS (1987)).
156. Id. at 78.
157. Id. at 186.
158. See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text. Kitzinger and Perkins specifically con-
trast consciousness-raising to therapy. See KrZINGER & PERKINS, supra note 155, at 75-81.
159. Id. at 184.
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women and people of color, or that support ecological pollution, remain
untheorized and virtually unnoticed. Revolution may still be desirable,
but it will occur at the end of specific personal narratives, with the indi-
vidual attainment of the cure of "self-esteem. " "
Thus, although we may proffer our individual narratives as a spe-
cific rebuke to present constructions of power, this very proffering occurs
in a therapeutic climate which prizes individual pathologies. While my
story of being discriminated against by a specific university ("we don't
know if we're ready for a lesbian on our faculty") may be meant to pro-
voke political outrage, perhaps it is only intelligible within a psychologi-
cal framework that will attend to my feelings of hurt, or at most, patholo-
gize the "homophobia. " 161 Likewise, political positions on the
desirability of same-sex marriage become intelligible only as the product
of individual narratives. Discussions among ourselves about political
change are thereby inhibited.1 62 Paradoxically, and I think mistakenly,
the narratives of our personal experiences no longer simply inform or
"ground" our politics; such narratives can become our teleologies.
5. Another paradoxical effect is that our counter-narratives provoke
other counter-narratives, often directly incorporating and responding to
lesbian/queer-produced narratives. The conservative right's notorious
video The Gay Agenda is largely a reproduction (and editing) of les-
bian/queer narratives.6 3 As lesbian theorist Didi Herman notes in her
excellent book, The Anti-Gay Agenda, conservative material "makes fre-
quent use" of "the texts of gay writers themselves," to support its themes
160. See, e.g., GLORIA STEINEM, REVOLUTION FROM WITHIN (1992).
161. Kitzinger and Perkins note that the replacement of "oppression" with the term "homo-
phobia" is part of the domination of psychology over politics. KITZINGER & PERKINS, supra
note 155, at 186..
162. As lesbian theorist Caryatis Cardea compellingly argues, the therapeutic process is the
process of lesbian and feminist collectives, groups, and even relationships. See Caryatis
Cardea, Lesbian Revolution and the 50 Minute Hour: A Working-Class Look at Therapy and
the Movement, in LESBIAN PHILOSOPHIES AND CULTURES 193, 196-216 (Jeffner Allen ed.,
1990). Cardea's stunning insight, however, is not simply the pervasiveness of therapeutic
structures, but the way in which they enable middle class lesbians to exert power over lower-
classed lesbians. See id. at 196-216. Moving beyond the simple notion that a lesbian's partici-
pation in therapy usually requires a degree of economic freedom, Cardea argues that the very
tenets of therapy (expressing needs, the emphasis on the individual over the group) are derived
from middle-class values. See id.
163. Videotape: The Gay Agenda (Bill Horn 1992). For an argument regarding its status
as narrative, see infra text accompanying notes 188-90.
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of disease and seduction." Gay "success stories" of achievement, espe-
cially economic achievement, are harnessed by conservatives to demon-
strate their claim that sexual minorities do not suffer discrimination."
The use of counter-narrative also occurs in Richard Duncan's recent
law review article entitled Wigstock and the Kulturkampf" Supreme Court
Storytelling, the Culture War, and Romer v. Evans, 6 in which he argues
that the landmark case of Romer v. Evans67 is both incorrect and irrele-
164. DIDI HERMAN, THE ANTI-GAY AGENDA: ORTHODOX VISION AND THE CHRISTIAN
RIGHT 78 (1997). Rather than using the generic term "conservative," Herman defines what she
calls the "Christian Right," but part of the value of her book is that she focuses upon what
might be termed the mainstream Christian Right rather than its more radical elements. See id.
at 11-12. Herman also makes clear that the rhetoric of disease and seduction, as well as most of
the Christian Right's attention, is aimed at gay men. See id. at 76. Her insightful treatment of
the Christian Right's strategy regarding lesbians, in a chapter entitled "No Lesbians, Gay Les-
bians, Feminist Lesbians" argues that lesbians are generally made invisible, made an extension
of gay men, or made an extension of feminism. Id. at 92-110.
165. The narratives are very abbreviated, usually into a static portrait of two college-
educated gay men touring Europe and/or dining in expensive restaurants. See Jean Hardisty &
Amy Gluckman, The Hoax of "Special Rights": The Right Wing's Attack on Gay Men and Les-
bians, in HOMOECONOMICS: CAPITALISM, COMMuNITY, AND LESBIAN AND GAY LIFE 209
(Amy Gluckman & Betsy Reed eds., 1997). The narratives are also supported by statistics
about gay and lesbian economic status, appropriated from studies done by marketing groups
seeking to seduce advertisers. See id.
166. Richard F. Duncan, Wgstock and the Kulturkampf. Supreme Court Storytelling, the
Culture War, and Romer v. Evans, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 345 (1997).
167. Romer v. Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996). Romer, also known as the Colorado
Amendment Two case, qualifies as a landmark simply because it is the very first time that les-
bian/queer equality issues have been successful in the United States Supreme Court.
This success arrives after some stunning defeats. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
190-91 (1986), ten years earlier, the Court gave constitutional imprimatur to state statutes
which criminalized homosexual sexual practices. Perhaps less well-known, but equally offen-
sive, was the Court's decision in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 547-48 (1987), in which the Court held that the United States Olympic
Committee owned the word "Olympic" and could seek an injunction against the "Gay Olym-
pics" for infringement, despite the fact that it had granted use of the term "Olympic" to other
groups (such as the "Explorer Olympics"), and despite its failure to enforce its right against
other groups (as with the "Crab-racing Olympics"). Similarly, in Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 579-81 (1995), the Court overruled
the Massachusetts Supreme Court and held that the group organizing Boston's St. Patrick's Day
Parade did not violate state laws by excluding gay, lesbian, and bisexual Irish-Americans from
the St. Patrick's Day Parade, because the Parade Organizers had a First Amendment right to
determine the content of the parade.
In Romer, the Court recognized the anti-gay aminus behind Colorado's Amendment Two
which provided in pertinent part:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of
its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact,
adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or
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vant. 168 Duncan includes an awkwardly crafted section entitled "A Per-
sonal Narrative" 69 which does contain personal declarations, although
not structured in any recognizable narrative form, 70 as well as a more
narratively structured discussion of a case involving a landlord who
sought to evade nondiscrimination laws through a religious exemption.'
otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any
minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
116 S.Ct. at 1623 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b). In ruling upon the constitutionality
of the provision, the Court stated, "We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexu-
als not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This
Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws." Id. at
1629.
168. See Duncan, supra note 166, throughout. For contrary opinions, see, for example,
Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L. RPv. 203
(1996) and Larry Alexander, Sometimes Better Boring and Correct: Romer v. Evans as an Ex-
ercise of Ordinary Equal Protection Analysis, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 335 (1997).
However, even among those who support the Court's decision in Romer, as Janet Halley
notes, the majority decision has "gained notoriety as an imperfect text." Janet Halley, Romer
v. Hardwick, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 429, 429 (1997). Halley discusses the doctrinal "gaps" in
the Court's opinion, but argues that we should not necessarily rush to close them lest we come
not to understand their operation in legal discourse. Id. at 433.
169. Duncan, supra note 166, at 369-71.
170. Duncan's personal narrative consists of declarative statements such as: "I was an ad-
vocate in Romer. I wrote an amicus brief in support of the Amendment. My personal support
for the Amendment was animated by libertarian considerations." Id. at 369-70. Later in the
"personal narrative" section, he states: "I supported Amendment 2 because I understood the
stigmatizing effect of gay rights laws on persons who cling steadfastly to traditional notions of
sexual morality in post-modem America." Id. at 371.
171. The case Duncan cursorily relates is Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n,
913 P.2d 909, 913, (Cal. 1996), in which a landlord argued that she could engage in marital
status discrimination because her religious beliefs included the idea that unmarried cohabitation
was sinful. The California Supreme Court, reversing the court of appeals, decided that the
landlord's religious beliefs could not prevail over the public's interest in nondiscrimination. Id.
at 913. Duncan simply relates the facts but does not discuss the legal issues. See Duncan, su-
pra note 166, at 370-71.
Other state courts that have addressed marital status discrimination by landlords have
reached contradictory results. See, e.g., Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874
P.2d 274, 278 (Alaska 1994) (holding that landlord discriminated on the basis of marital status);
Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 243 (Mass. 1994) (holding in favor of land-
lord); State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 11 (Minn. 1990) (holding in favor of landlord).
For discussions of some of the cases and doctrinal explications of the conflict between pro-
hibiting discrimination on the basis of marital status and the free exercise of religion, see David
Kushner, Note, Free Exercise, Fair Housing and Marital Status-Alaskan Style, 12 ALAsKA L.
REV. 335 (1995); Magorzata (Margo) K. Laskowska, Comment, "No Sinners Under My
Roof": Can Californa Landlords Refuse to Rent to Unmarried Couples by Claiming a Religious
Freedom of Exercise Exemption from a Statute Wich Prohibits Marital Status Discrimination?,
36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 219 (1995).
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Further, Duncan sprinkles the piece with footnotes from the Bible,"7
which is itself composed of narratives. 73
I am not arguing that the narrative form is especially susceptible to
being countered, either through the production of oppositional stories or
through appropriation. For example, Duncan, the author of Wigstock
and the Kulturkampf also seeks to reverse categories, positing "religious
persons" as the "true outsiders" and the "gay elite" as insiders. 74 Fur-
ther, Duncan uses a quote from the famous lesbian writer Gertrude
Stein17 to critique the majority opinion in Romer v. Evans.76 Conserva-
tives routinely utilize statistics and scientific studies to bolster their theo-
logically derived arguments."T 7 What I am arguing, however, is that the
use of narrative is not sufficiently special to insulate it from contradictory
uses, and that the use of narrative cannot be confined emancipatory pur-
poses.
6. The use of Wigstock: The Movie'75 -a visual narrative-in a very
anti-queer piece of legal scholarship points to yet another paradox of us-
ing narrative. Duncan uses the movie, which he describes as "a docu-
mentary about the drag queen festival held on Labor Day each year in-
did you need to ask?-New York City" and as "screamingly funny and
wretchingly sad" to illustrate what he calls "homosexual fundamentalism"
and to illustrate what he presumably finds (most?) objectionable about
queer culture.'79 This usage demonstrates that if we wish to challenge his
172. See Duncan, supra note 166, at 345 n.*, 363 n.92, 371 n.154.
173. See, e.g., CALUM CARMICHAEL, LAW AND NARRATIVE IN THE BIBLE: THE
EVIDENCE OF THE DEUTERONOMIC LAWS AND THE DECALOGUE (1985); GERARD LOUGHLIN,
TELLING GOD'S STORY: BIBLE, CHURCH, AND NARRATIVE THEOLOGY (1996); THE BIBLE
AND NARRATIVE TRADITION (Frank McConnell ed., 1991).
174. Thus, Duncan echoes Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Romer v. Evans, 116 S.Ct.
1620, 1631 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. Gertrude Stein (1874-1946) was a poet, novelist, essayist, and memoirist, and is con-
sidered one of the most innovative writers in the modem era. See OxFORD COMPANION TO
WOMEN'S WRITING, supra note 8, at 846. Perhaps her best-known work is The Autobiography
of Alice B. Toklas, a memoir written from the point of view of her lover. See id. at 847. Stein
and Toklas spent 35 years together, living mostly in Paris. See id. at 847-48.
176. See Duncan, supra note 166, at 347. Duncan states that "if one searches for sophisti-
cated legal reasoning in the Court's decision in Romer he [sic] will be disappointed because
'there is no there there,'" and footnotes to "Gertrude Stein's famous description of Oakland" in
GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1937). See id. at 347 & n.12. Whether
the use of the work of a famous lesbian writer in a critique of the Court's first favorable les-
bian/queer decision is ironic or simply unintentional is not obvious.
177. See HERMAN, supra note 164, at 78.
178. WIGSTOCK-THE MOVIE (Goldwyn 1995).
179. Duncan, supra note 166, at 362.
stereotypes with counter-narratives, then we can be forced to select the
most anti-stereotypical, conforming, and palatable narratives. 180
So, for example, in Marc Fajer's attempt to counter what he has
identified as the "sex as lifestyle" "pre-understanding," he quite reason-
ablely chooses to emphasize stories about long-term relationships." Yet
as he notes, he risks "accusations" that he is "in some sense 'selling-out'
[by] saying we have to model ourselves after nongay ideals to be ac-
cepted." 8 2  Fajer defends himself against this possible accusation by ar-
guing that he is being descriptive: "in many important respects, many of
us are very much like heterosexuals in the nature of our aspirations, our
relationships, and many other aspects of our lives."1' But even assuming
this is true, it seems to me that it requires suppression (or at least de-
emphasis) of the stories that might confirm the pre-understanding. Thus,
an attempt to combat the "sex as lifestyle" stereotype requires a rejection
of the lesbian/queer stories involving experimentation or explorations of
our sexuality.
The preference for respectable narratives also occurs in reform liti-
gation."8 It does, of course, appear to be the best strategy to select what
I have elsewhere called the "whitest and brightest" lesbian/queer clients
or "but-for" dykes and other queers as plaintiffs to challenge an oppres-
180. I do not mean to suggest that the stereotypes to be challenged are necessarily coherent.
As David Halperin has argued, "homophobic discourses are incoherent" but their incoherence
empowers rather than incapacitates them. DAVID M. HALPERIN, SAINT FOUCAULT:
TOWARDS A GAY HAGIOGRAPHY 34 (1995). "In fact, homophobic discourses operate strategi-
cally by means of logical contradictions." Id. Halperin uses a legal example to illustrate his
point, noting that courts have rejected protection for queers because homosexuality is not an
immutable characteristic, even as courts have held that "homosexuals as a group do share at
least one immutable characteristic: by definition we all commit sodomy." Id.
Additional examples in support of Halperin's argument occur in conservative anti-gay
rhetoric. As Didi Herman compellingly elucidates, in conservative Christian documents homo-
sexual men are portrayed as anarchic pagan savages (as demonstrated by pride parade footage of
shirtless men with painted and tattooed bodies), even as male homosexuality is portrayed as as-
sociated with Nazism (as exemplified by a jackbooted, totalitarian, "control-freak"), even as
there is a segment of the conservative right which seeks to emulate the Nazis. See HERMAN,
supra note 164, at 91. Herman also points to other rhetorical inconsistencies in antigay dis-
course, including the absolute incoherency of lesbians, who are simultaneously invisible, hyper-
masculinized, pathetic, economically privileged, identical to gay men, and man-hating. See id.
at 92-110.
181. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?, supra note 56, at 529.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. For a discussion of several cases, see Darren Rosenblum, Queer Intersectionality and
the Failure of Recent Lesbian and Gay "Victories, "4 LAw & SEx. 83 (1994).
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sive legal rule.t"' Yet I continue to believe that such a tactic is ultimately
divisive and does not afford legal protection for the diversities of les-
bian/queer lives." 6
Focusing on litigation narratives which might combat stereotypes can
also have the effect of desexualizing lesbian/queers. For example, in
much of the litigation challenging military regulations which bar homo-
sexual conduct, advocates have advanced arguments that a declaration of
homosexuality does not necessarily mean sexual conduct, thus betraying
"the celebration of sexuality for which the gay rights movement once
stood."'8 7 Further, the possibility is bleak that an individual narrative can
remain sexual and yet adequately confront the narratives of sexual de-
pravity and criminality entrenched in our current jurisprudence. 88 Even
further, as Julie Shapiro has demonstrated in the child custody context,
the stories which are acceptable may exclude not only sexuality, but af-
fection.8 9 Thus, paradoxically, our reliance on narrative to combat
stereotypes threatens to divide us from each other and also encourages
self-censorship.
7. Finally, and perhaps most paradoxically, narrativity itself is an
extremely troubled practice. What I have been calling the "narrative" of
the movie Wigstock is in fact barely a narrative at all. Despite the ubiq-
uity of narrative, 1" not everything is narratively structured. Wigstock:
The Movie is a documentary of an event and its structure is more of a
pastiche-a collection of relatively random images, though making use of
repetition-than of a narrative that leads ineluctably from beginning to
end."9 ' While legal argument could be said to have a narrative structure,
we generally distinguish between logic and story, between analysis and
185. See, e.g., RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAw: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF
LAw 87 (1992).
186. See id. See generally Rosenblum, supra note 184.
187. Teresa M. Bruce, Note, Doing the Nasty: An Argument for Bringing Same-Sex Erotic
Conduct Back into the Courtroom, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1135, 1172 (1996).
188. While Larry Catd Backer attempts to be optimistic that change is possible through ex-
posing the courts to many narratives, his work supports his conclusion that the outlook is
"bleak." See Backer, supra note 58, at 595.
189. Julie Shapiro, Custody and Conduct: How the Law Fails Lesbian and Gay Parents
and Their Children, 71 IND. L.J. 623, 647-48 (1996).
190. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
191. For discussions of such distinctions in film theory, see generally DE LAURETIS, supra
note 43; TERESA DE LAURETIS, THE PRACTICE OF LOVE: LESBIAN SEXUALITY AND PERVERSE
DESIRE 81-123 (1994); MARY ANN DOANE, FEMMES FATALES: FEMINISM, FILM THEORY,
PSYCHOANALYSIS (1991); JUDITH MAYNE, THE WOMAN AT THE KEYHOLE: FEMINISM AND
WOMEN'S CINEMA (1990).
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facts. In our celebration of narrativity, the category can expand to in-
clude almost everything, thereby losing its explanatory power.' 92
More fundamentally, it is paradoxical that we might proffer narra-
tive as a successful strategy at the end of narrativity itself. As lesbian
theorist Sue-Ellen Case argues in The Domain-Matrix: Performing Les-
bian at the End of Print Culture, the current age is engaged in a "contest
between two orders, previously perceived as alphabetic and visual but
technologically represented by print and the screen."" 9 Case makes it
clear that print/alphabetic culture is associated with traditional narrative
structures and that screen/visual culture is associated with the nonnarra-
ive: "The printed page, by the nature of its technology, enforces the se-
quential development of ideas, whereas the computer screen offers multi-
ple arrangements of data .... "" Although a printed book, Case
attempts to emulate screenic qualities in the design and production of The
Domain-Matrix, encouraging the reader to "surf" through the text rather
than be constrained by its linearity, and including bold-faced text meant
to mimic hypertext links available on a computer."~ Hypertext, which
192. For example, William Eskridge, in his article Gaylegal Narratives, supra note 57,
cites some of my work as exemplifying "work[ ] in which gaylesbian narratives are central to
the argument presented." Id. at 609-10 n.12 (citing ROBSON, supra note 185; Ruthann Robson,
Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law and Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REv. 567 (1990)). Yet it does not seem to me that narratives were central. In the almost
two hundred pages of Lesbian (Out)Law, for example, there are perhaps three "personal" nar-
ratives, one section in which sexual episodes from a novel are used as "facts" upon which the
"law" of statutes regulating lesbian sexuality are applied, and the standard factual recitations in
discussions of important or illustrative cases. See ROBSON, supra note 185, throughout.
193. SUE-ELLEN CASE, THE DOMAIN-MATRIX: PERFORMING LESBIAN AT THE END OF
PRINT CULTURE 27 (1996).
194. Id. at 33.
195. These techniques are not entirely successful. As I stated in a review of the book:
The paradox of publishing a book about the end of books is not lost on Case. She ex-
plains her often frustrating attempts to construct the book so that it could reach be-
yond its book-ness and to emulate screenic experience. Yet, using a page border with
arrows and computer commands does not actually disturb the reality of the paper in
the reader's hands. Similarly, Case's strategy of using bold-faced words to approxi-
mate hyper-text and instructing the reader to "view" a different part of the book does
not simulate the embedded linkages available using computers. Regrettably, this use
of the instructions to view other sections of the book replicates one of the defects of
cyber-research: the availability of a link to something else can substitute for a full
explication at the present site. Thus, an under-developed argument can be augmented
by a citation/link to another section, but upon arrival at the new location, one finds a
different under-developed argument with a reference/link back to the original site.
This is not to imply, however, that most of Case's arguments are under-developed,
only that I wish she would have spent less energy on achieving screens and more en-
ergy on expanding some of her own ideas.
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can be defined as "text composed of blocks of words (or images) linked
electronically by multiple paths, chains, or trails"1" itself "challenges
narrative and all literary forms based on linearity [and] calls into question
ideas of plot and story current since Aristotle." 1" Hypertext makes
problematic the notion of beginning, which becomes increasingly arbi-
trary, as well as the notion of ending, which may rest more upon fatigue
than satisfying closure.198 Perhaps most at risk, however, are the Aristo-
telian ideas that beginning, middle, and end form a coherent whole with a
definite "magnitude." 199 A hypertext experience is constructed by the
"reader" rather than the text; its length and unity are optional at best.'
Those venerating technological culture are not the only ones who ar-
gue that computerization is troubling to narrative coherence. If Hayden
White is correct in equating narrativity with culture,' °1 then the arguments
against "technopoly" as destructive of "traditional narratives and sym-
bols" and offering only "technical expertise, and the ecstasy of consump-
Ruthann Robson, The End of Lesbian Writing?, in LAMBDA BOOK REPORT 25, 25-26 (June
1997).
196. GEORGE P. LANDOW, HYPERTEXT: THE CONVERGENCE OF CONTEMPORARY
CRITICAL THEORY AND TECHNOLOGY 3 (1992).
As more fully elaborated by another critic:
"Hypertext" is not a system but a generic term, coined a quarter of a century ago by a
computer populist named Ted Nelson to describe the writing done in the nonlinear or
nonsequential space made possible by the computer. Moreover, unlike print text, hy-
pertext provides multiple paths between text segments, now often called "lexias" in a
borrowing from the pre-hypertextual but prescient Roland Barthes. With its webs of
linked lexias, its networks of alternate routes (as opposed to print's fixed unidirec-
tional page-turning) hypertext presents a radically divergent technology, interactive
and polyvocal, favoring a plurality of discourses over definitive utterance and freeing
the reader from domination by the author.
Robert Coover, The End of Books, N.Y. TiMEs BOOK REV., June 21, 1992, at 43.
197. LANDOW, supra note 196, at 101.
198. See, e.g., id. at 118.
199. Id. at 101-02. For Aristotle, the proper magnitude of a narrative is "one that can be
easily taken in by the memory." ARISTOTLE'S POETICS, supra note 39, Ch. VII at 15.
200. As Robert Coover phrases it,
And what of narrative flow? There is still movement, but in hyperspace's dimen-
sionless infinity, it is more like endless expansion; it runs the risk of being so dis-
tended and slackly driven as to lose its centripetal force, to give way to a kind of
static low-charged lyricism-that dreamy gravityless lost-in-space feeling of the early
sci-fi films. How does one resolve the conflict between the reader's desire for coher-
ence and closure and the text's desire for continuance, its fear of death? Indeed, what
is closure in such an environment? If everything is middle, how do you know when
you are done, either as reader or writer?
Coover, supra note 196, at 43.
201. See supra note 137.
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tion" are certainly pertinent.' 2 White's linking of narrativity with culture
and even humanity is similarly implicated by the work of critic Sven
Birkerts in The Gutenberg Elegies, eloquently arguing that the rise of the
computer and the decline of the reading of books threaten our culture and
our humanity." 3 Discussing his displeasure with hypertext, Birkerts ar-
gues that its promise to deliver the reader from the "univocal linearity" of
the book is not enticing because the very reason Birkerts reads "fixed
acres of print" is to be subjected to an author's masterful narrative. '
Both paeans and reproaches to the end of print culture, however,
may be overstated. One is reminded of discussions of the struggle be-
tween oral culture and so-called alphabet culture. In the Platonic dia-
logue Phaedrus, Socrates relates a story of the Egyptian god Theuth
whose offer of the art of writing to the wise king Thamus was rebuked
because the king believed that writing's usurpation of orality would be the
demise of memory and wisdom.'3 According to a contemporary phi-
losopher, the transition from pictographs, hieroglyphics, and other visual
representations to a phonetic alphabet ruptured the human and nonhuman
worlds, divorcing human semiotic meaning from the narratives of na-
ture.' 6 This divorce was finalized with the invention of the printing
press, because of both the replacement of calligraphy by standardized
202. See, e.g., NEIL POSTMAN, TECHNOPOLY: THE SURRENDER OF CULTURE TO
TECHNOLOGY 179 (1992).
203. See SVEN BIRKERTS, THE GUTENBERG ELEGIES: THE FATE OF READING IN AN
ELECTRONIC AGE 118-32 (1994).
204. Id. at 164.
205. If men learn this [writing], it will implant forgetfulness in their souls; they will cease
to exercise memory because they rely on that which is written, calling things to re-
membrance no longer from within themselves, but by means of external marks. What
you have discovered is a recipe not for memory, but for reminder. And it is no true
wisdom that you offer your disciples, but only its semblance, for by telling them of
many things without teaching them you will make them seem to know much, while for
the most part they know nothing, and as men filled, not with wisdom, but with the
conceit of wisdom, they will be a burden to their fellows.
PLATO, Phaedrus, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES, supra note 12, at 520 (line 275-275b).
Socrates' position at the end of the dialogue is predictably more nuanced. Socrates does not per
se condemn the form of writing but seeks to make a distinction between writing that has been
done "with a knowledge of the truth," and whose author can defend it orally, with writing that
is simply composed of phrases that the writer has twisted, pasted, and pulled. Id. at 524 (line
278c-d).
206. DAVID ABRAM, THE SPELL OF THE SENSUOUS: PERCEPTION AND LANGUAGE IN A
MORE-THAN-HUMAN WORLD 100-39 (1996). Throughout this excellent book, Abram argues
that we have replaced our ability to "read" nature with the ability to read inked marks upon flat
pages. See id.
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type,2 and the widespread availability of written texts. Yet as compel-
ling as these arguments may be, they have not meant the death of mem-
ory, nature,' or narrative, but only change, however dramatic.
Similarly, neither the paeans nor reproaches unequivocably reject
narrative. Claims that narrative will be "reconfigured"21 by hypertext
are not necessarily the same as claims that nar Authority rative will cease.
A narrative supplied by reader rather than author is nevertheless a narra-
tive. While the classical definitions formulated by Aristotle are certainly
implicated, there is no certainty that the structure of beginning-middle-
end or the coherence of unity are absolutely necessary for narrativity in
the new millennium.
Yet it is undoubtable that narrative is troubled. It is paradoxical that
we might proffer narrative as a path to emancipation at a time when the
continuation of narrative as we have known it is becoming increasingly
suspect. We may be telling our stories at the end of the story of story-
telling.
beginning at last
It is too late to begin again, but I want to return to the returning
woman who read aloud the Muriel Rukeyser poem about Kthe Kollwitz.
Because there is something else I remember. Something else besides her
toothpaste tube and her television set and her physician husband. Some-
thing else besides the Valium and the sharp voice. Some other detail
necessary to this story.
This something else happened later. It was warm; I remember that.
We were outside, tucked into a stand of trees on the knoll of a hill behind
the library. Perhaps we were working on a project together, maybe for
the same class, maybe even on Muriel Rukeyser's poetry. I really don't
remember, and I could offer the excuse that it was more than twenty
years ago, but I probably didn't remember these details the next semes-
ter. But what I did remember, the next semester and even now, is that
she was wearing a yellow shirtdress and her sandals had ankle straps. I
remember that her slip was full and white and soft and underneath it her
207. Id. at 199 (making the distinction between hand-lettered books and standardized texts).
208. Interestingly, Coover implies that hypertext is more respectful of nature than is print,
because of the "forest-harvesting, paper-wasting" required to produce print media. Coover,
supra note 196, at 43.
209. LANDOW, supra note 196, at 101-19.
bra felt like cardboard. I remember her underpants were not cotton, but
something synthetic and unpleasant.
I remember the sex.
And what I learned from that experience was what her narrative
sought to convey. I learned what it meant to be a returning woman. I
learned what it meant to have a husband and children and a life one didn't
enjoy. I didn't learn everything, of course, and I didn't learn articulable
details about toothpaste tubes. But in a certain slope of the shoulder, a
shudder of sweat, I experienced an empathy that had previously eluded
me.
I also experienced her beyond empathy. And I allowed her to expe-
rience me that way. Inhabiting a space that does not have a
male/heterosexual structure, a place that is originary and original. In that
uncontestable site where narrative is absolutely absent. Bordering being
neither individual nor collective, and not subject to being countered or
censored.
In that compelling moment when it seems as if the world just might
split open.
This did not make for a lasting relationship, or any relationship.
After that semester, the only other time I saw her was in the restau-
rant where I waitressed. She was part of a party of five, drank three dai-
quiris, and ordered chicken cordon bleu.
I do not know how she fit the sexual episode into the narrative of her
own sexual history and identity. I fit it into mine as another escapade
that I would not mention to my then-girlfriend, despite our commitment
to being honestly nonmonogamous.
And now, of course, I try to reconstruct that bodily engagement
here-as a narrative about the paradoxes of narrative.
The paradoxes in which I am interested do not speak of narrative's
inferiority to logical argument. Logical argument cannot capture sandals
with ankle straps, women's sweat, and sex. And sometimes, yes, some-
times, narrative can. But only paradoxically.
Thus, I am not suggesting we eschew narrative any more than I am
suggesting we abandon rationality.
I confess I love them both.
But I am arguing that we must never reject or neglect our sexual en-
ergy in all its various expressions. And we must unfailingly preserve and
honor the illogical, nonverbal, nonarticulate, nonnarrative beauty of our
lives.
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